# Wales and the Wider World

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## Wales and the Human Condition

‘An upheaval from being’s very roots . . . gurgling up hot lava suddenly on to the green grass.’ I begin with a quotation from a Welsh novelist — Welsh by self-election rather than origin — in a work which has a claim to be one of the great fictional treatments of European politics (F.1). Richard Hughes, in a trilogy *The Human Condition,* of which only two books, *The Fox in the Attic* (1961) and *The Wooden Shepherdess* (1973), were actually completed, tried to create a picture of European politics after the trauma of the First World War. In these works the problems of both a depressed industrial and an archaic rural Wales could be related to those socio-political breakdowns in continental Europe which had produced the Nazis.

**F.1**

At the core of the first volume he uses this vivid metaphor. Where does Wales fit into this? Perhaps that sense of personal identity at the core of the ‘we—they’ contrast might be contained and managed where the ‘we’ is small-scale, non-Utopian, bound by language, culture, and the accessible local community. And this may have been Hughes’s intention when, after a life spent roving through post-Versailles Europe and recording the impact of the Second World War, he returned to Talgarth, near Harlech, where he undertook this last project.

In his ambitions for *The Human Condition,* Hughes seems to reflect the contrasts visible in Wales’s twentieth-century international career. At one level the Welsh, the Welsh-born, or activists and organizations based in Wales, have played a disproportionate role in world politics: think of Lloyd George, the saviour of Britain in the First World War and one of the architects (for better or worse) of the ethnic-national Europe of the Versailles settlement; or of the Fabian Thomas Jones, influencing the entourage of Baldwin and MacDonald in a liberal, post-imperial direction. Aneurin Bevan’s efforts to thaw the Cold War in the 1950s were similarly concerned with international affairs, as was James Callaghan’s use of his links with Henry Kissinger in the mid-1970s.

More moralistic were Lord Davies’s benefactions to the League of Nations movement, in Wales and beyond: the international relations chair at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the Temple of Peace and Health in Cathays Park, were inaugurated in the otherwise ominous year of 1937. In the 1960s and after, the country’s peace tradition helped give rise to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Bertrand Russell and the Committee of 100 and, later on, to the Greenham Common women. After the war, and increasing in influence in the 1970s, there was the Austrian Leopold Kohr’s ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy, affecting the Green and environmentalist movement, and Plaid Cymru.

But in this process of influence, the springs of action are not always straightforwardly political or rational. What the American historian Daniel J.

Boorstin publicized as the 'image' also mattered. Visiting the Dolgellau Eisteddfod in 1949, Sir Reginald Coupland was struck by how foreign it clearly was, and in general by the interest of the Welsh in international as well as in Welsh affairs (F.2). From the 1940s, in embryo, and since the 1970s in actuality, Wales has become a field of interchange for European regionalist movements. This has cultural origins, owing much to Plaid Cymru's interest in other European culture-nations, its defence of Breton nationalists from post-war revanchism, and to the international links of the National Eisteddfod and Urdd Gobaith Cymru, elaborated after 1947 by the Llangollen International Eisteddfod. More recently it has taken on a cross-party focus, with the political and economic concept of a 'Europe of the Regions', bound up with the attraction of inward investment and the transfer of high technology (F.3). Yet it still retains deep and complex cultural roots.

**F.2**

**F.3**

How, for example, do we judge the effect on the international 'recognition' of Wales, of Dylan Thomas, in his recordings, broadcasts, and the tours that eventually killed him? A poem like 'Fern Hill' (F.4) both transposed the language of the chapel into a sort of rustic hedonism, and equated the small community with an age of innocence, something which had a huge appeal in the post-war anglophone world. Thomas was apolitical when sober, and had no time for Welsh nationalism — 'my opinion of Welsh nationalism can be expressed in three words, two of which are Welsh nationalism' — but his 'image' and his poems helped generate that vague but potent discontent with modern materialism and the military-industrial society that was summed up by the songs of one American disciple, Bob Zimmerman of Minnesota, who took the name Bob Dylan.

**F.4**

Dylan Thomas was of the first generation explicitly to regard themselves as Anglo-Welsh. Much of his early poetry was published in Keidrich Rhys's *Wales,* whose programme shows that his contemporaries were conscious of the Irish and Scottish renaissances, and already suspicious of the metropolis — although Rhys ran his journal from one pub or another in Soho (F. 5). That sense of an independent voice — of being 'at a slight angle to the universe', as E. M. Forster described another 'hybrid' writer, the Alexandrian Greek C.F. Cafavy — provided resources for international communication denied to a monoglot Welsh culture, albeit at a price.

**F.5**

As Philip Cooke and his Cardiff colleagues show, the sort of regional-internationalism that this has enabled is now directly affecting the lives of many Welsh people (F.3). A sense of dialogue with other societies, in which the metropolis, with its coercive power and its arrogance, is sidelined, has rapidly developed over the last two decades. Lord Elis Thomas has written of an 'informal' Welsh constitution evolving, largely thanks to external recognition of the country's distinctiveness (F.6).

**F.3**

**F.6**

On the other hand it is less easy to locate the precise 'Welshness' of the political element of these movements. Wales has had an impressive record in stocking Westminster front-benches, in terms of seats and personalities: as leaders of the Labour party, Keir Hardie, Ramsay MacDonald, James Callaghan, Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock sat for Welsh constituencies. Aneurin Bevan, James Griffiths, Roy Jenkins and Merlyn Rees were no less important as Labour frontbenchers. Until recently the Scottish performance

was far more modest. Is this simply to do with the fact that it is physically possible to pursue a London political career and rapidly get back to a rock-solid south Wales seat when necessary — something which may or may not rub off on the actual electorate? What is specifically Welsh about Bevan's stint as Labour shadow foreign secretary, 1956–61? Given his ferocity in opposing ideas of Welsh self-government, how does he differ from a non-resident Welshman such as Sir Geoffrey Howe, Lord Howe of Aberavon, as foreign minister, 1983–8?

## The Stateless Nation

At this point we must ask some basic questions. Wales is a nation which seems to be acquiring a state of sorts (F.6). How? What role has formal politics played in this? What economic motivations have lain behind it? What social and cultural institutions? And, finally, what critical political struggles have brought it about?

**F.6**

The state-nation issue is central. Because of the debate about how much of a nation, or how many nations, Wales is, or was, Gwyn A. Williams's famous meditation about Wales, nationhood and time, in *When Was Wales?* ended on a deeply pessimistic note (F.7). Written in 1985, this bears the scar of the twin defeats of the 1979 referendum and the miners' strike — perhaps also of the rise to Labour leadership of Neil Kinnock, a politician of markedly unionist views. But notice also the symbolism — always something to be looked for in the Celts: 'There's more enterprise | In walking naked' was how W.B. Yeats (borrowing from Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*?) concluded the poem quoted by Gwyn A. Williams. This suggests a more positive outcome: the need for a periodic reassessment of the national condition — throwing off old clothes.

**F.7**

We can apply the same sort of analysis to Denis Balsom, who slightly earlier, had produced his 'Three Wales Model' (in John Osmond (ed.), *The National Question Again,* Llandysul, 1983). Less pessimistic, for it took into account the regional success of Plaid Cymru, this still suggested a limited future for Wales as a unit. Did time or social fractures portend the Welsh nation shrunk to a *1066 and All That* or *Sun*-reader level of rugby fifteens, women in funny hats, complicated place-names and over-simple surnames? (For Scotland see kilts, golf, whisky, meanness and the Loch Ness Monster.) Perhaps not: Balsom may have had J.B. Priestley's notion of 'four Englands' in mind, from his *English Journey* (1934): historic England, Victorian England, modern England and derelict England. This did not in itself deny any English capacity to cohere, but it shows (as with Gwyn A. Williams's naked people) a tendency to borrow English (or Irish or Scottish) cultural and literary models to try to define Welsh identity. By contrast, Northern Ireland is different again. Not only is it difficult to make jokes about terrorism, but no one (in Germany, say) is ever likely to call Dr Ian Paisley English — although they were perfectly capable of calling Neil Kinnock thus.

Arguably, this problem is transitory. States fit into a structure of international representation which defines them. They have embassies, delegations and diplomats; they are allocated space in the standard works of reference produced by the United Nations and other bodies. When these institutions are absent, cultural and political factors count for more, but these have a

directional definition: they register with some receivers, but not with others. Hence the paradox that while the traditional markers of Welsh distinctiveness — the indigenous nature of the population, language, religion — have been either in decline or struggling to hold their own, the international distinctiveness of the nation has increased. The Council for Wales and Monmouthshire in 1948, followed by the Welsh Office in 1964, have incrementally created a political focus in Cardiff which was able to make good even the setback of the 1979 referendum. Many more would now follow Raymond Williams in describing themselves as Welsh European, than, say, twenty-five years ago.

## Party Positions

Do the Welsh still identify with Britain? At one time this would have been unquestioned. Now it seems much more to do with party and culture. Dr John Redwood, the English secretary of state for Wales at the time of writing, echoing the centralized conservatism of the 'New Right', regards his charge as a region (when his former minister of state Sir Wyn Roberts has termed it a state, and John Major a nation). Yet he is only expressing the same view as that held by Neil Kinnock in 1975 (F.8). Kinnock echoed Aneurin Bevan's famous attack on Welsh nationalism on 17 October 1944, denying that there was any marked difference between Wales's problems and those of any other industrial region. Yet even Kinnock has altered his position. 'Welshness' seems to mark significant and increasing party-political differences.

**F.8**

There are Welsh persons in the Conservative hierarchy — Michael Heseltine, Lord Howe, Michael Howard, Kenneth Baker, even (by descent) Lady Thatcher — but can we define them as such? Many are both 'British' and anti-European. Their only remaining Welsh clients have been those in the small-business sector, commuters, the population of the border districts and those who have retired to live along the northern littoral. Moreover, there is also an element which consciously seeks to mollify Welsh interest groups (and, perhaps, to divide and rule), as with Lord Walker's stint in the Welsh Office, 1987–90, during which time the partnership agreement with Baden-Württemberg was signed, and the more recent offer of enhanced representation in the Committee of the Regions, said to stem from John Major's 'special relationship' with Dafydd Wigley. The Welsh administrative state has continued to grow, even if the result — nationalism by quango — seems inherently unstable.

Labour's position arises from the three traditions which flow into the party. The early Independent Labour Party espoused much of the *gwerin* values of radical liberalism, including home rule, supported by Keir Hardie at Merthyr and James Griffiths at Llanelli. Proletarian internationalism regarded the miners as the vanguard of the class struggle, and some activists, such as Thomas Nicholas (Niclas y Glais) and S.O. Davies, aligned this with a radical communitarian sense. Others, notably Bevan, disapproved of a Welsh policy as reactionary, a view which dominated in the 1950s and 1960s. The Communists in the NUM and other left-wing unions maintained their links with eastern Europe, although this meant increasingly 'going through the motions' of fealty to grossly imperfect 'workers' states'. Might matters have been

different if a federal Spanish republic had won the civil war? Later, as heavy industry declined, the Labour movement took on a more nationalist position, not far from that of James Griffiths and Cledwyn Hughes. This middle-class *neo-gwerin* line ran into the débâcle of 1 March 1979, but since then, there has been a swing back to a more nationalist position. Yet Labour remains governed by its own priorities for attaining national power in the United Kingdom, in which the votes of Welsh MPs are essential. Outside the ranks of the Welsh MEPs and local authorities, how much interest is taken in European and international policy by the Welsh Labour movement?

Aerial view of Cathays Park, Cardiff, showing the Welsh Office and the Temple of Peace, c. 1960. (*Source: Welsh Industrial and Maritime Museum.*)

The Liberals took longer to decline in Wales than elsewhere, as it proved difficult to budge the rural community from its Nonconformist radicalism. But they are now peculiarly weak in Wales in electoral terms, business supporters going to the right, and the *gwerin* ending up in Labour or Plaid Cymru. Yet they retain an élite following which remains important in national voluntary bodies and maintains elements of the old pacifist and internationalist tradition. Plaid Cymru, in many ways the originators of the 'Wales in a Europe of the Regions' scenario, has moved from opposition to the European Community in the 1960s to enthusiasm. This was initially because the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) regime benefited their rural farming constituency; more recently, because they, in common with all the other anti-Conservative parties, see the conflict between Westminster and Brussels as a means of constraining a Westminster rule which they find increasingly oppressive.

## Manufacturing the Welsh State

Political parties exist first and foremost to represent interest groups. But where an administrative structure is erected, as with the Welsh Office in 1964, it will impose its own set of relationships. Effectively, the Welsh Office, created by and for James Griffiths, reflected both his 'Lib-Lab' *gwerin* outlook, and the equation that he made between Welsh self-government and the colonies which he sought to usher towards freedom while colonial secretary, 1950–1. But it had also to cope with the decline of the Welsh economy, which weakened the Conservatives as inheritors of Liberal industrialism in the 1920s, when its controllers were already migrating to London. (The *Dictionary of Business Biography* has few Welsh entries after about 1920.)

Labour's traditional base was the mining communities, the orphans of the 'Atlantic economy' of the Welsh heavy industries. But coal now fed the electricity-supply industry, and the networks of 'imperial Wales' — importing iron ore, copper and tin and pit-prop timber from Spain, America and the Baltic, and exporting steam-coal and anthracite world-wide — were abandoned. Steelmaking, likewise, concentrated on supplying strip to the West Midlands motor industry. Both industries were state-controlled after 1947–50. By the 1960s the 'Atlantic economy' was in a bad way, and with it many of the international connections that had been built up. What had come in its place?

In the 1960s the new 'Fordist' oil-and-car economy brought massive investment to Milford Haven, but few jobs. But, on the new industrial estates, the first German factories were opened in 1966; now there are fifty-five. There were only four Japanese employers in the whole of Britain in 1972, two of them in Wales; now Wales has the largest single agglomeration of Japanese-owned plants in Britain, if not in Europe. Add to this firms settling from other parts of Europe and America, warehouses for spare parts and the beginnings of research and development, and a new type of foreign representation is coming to maturity, which has arguably shifted Wales from the 'north' to the 'south' of the British economy (F.3).

F.3

The promotional and subsidy efforts of the Welsh Office and Welsh Development Agency are as 'international' as the diplomacy of sixty years ago. Multinational firms like Sony or Philips have, these days, turnovers as big as most members of the United Nations, and understanding their policy-formation and the motives that go into it is practically a subdivision of diplomacy. Are such firms footloose, motivated by low wage-rates and available public subsidies, prepared to move away to a new green-field site when a factory comes up for re-equipping? Are they drawn by the prospect of 'critical mass': the notion that once a particular level of development in one manufacturing area has been reached, the skills, economies of scale, infrastructure, will be of such high quality that other plants in the same line of business will be attracted? The longer-term outcome of this is that more high-value-added jobs will be attracted — in marketing, product development and systems control.

The result of research undertaken in Scotland's 'Silicone Glen' is not particularly reassuring about 'critical mass'. A lot of high-technology firms have been attracted, but only in their mass-production aspects (F.3).

F.3

Management and high-value operations have stayed away, even in activities like offshore oil, although this may change as profit margins in the North Sea shrink and firms move to Aberdeen out of compulsion rather than choice. Another approach to attracting management is more pro-active: to boost facilities for such activities as conferences, in the hope that the good (and relatively cheap) facilities, communications and cultural provision on show will mean that firms will be induced either to settle more headquarters' operations in Wales, or to transfer to the country some of their annual training/social/promotional activities.

However, one might be less than sanguine following the saga of Wales's own design-led multinational Laura Ashley, lost in the 1980s to City of London speculators.

## People to People

In Wales's case the post-industrial economy also involves the high-value-added end of tourism: what you could call the Swiss role. In this, an industry blurs its boundaries with society, or (less happily) with the 'life-style' of the advertising men. Which brings us to the international links created by the processes of socialization, which lie in family, community, education and religion.

These have shown many fractures. The Welsh family as working unit, threatened in the 1920s with redundancy, responded by partial emigration, creating lateral links with the Welsh abroad, and in London and the English Midlands, thus promoting integration and 'Britishness' — the burden of many novels by Raymond Williams, who set out to 'measure the distance' between 'community' and 'society', from *Border Country* (1961) to *Loyalties* (1985). There was also a strong contrast between transatlantic and European relationships. The former were politically radical, but also had a strong historical and religious continuity, whether with Welsh settlements in Pennsylvania or Patagonia, or with other cosmopolitan-industrial immigrant communities. The latter involved going back to older, pre-Reformation links, of scholars and the Catholic Church. Thus Saunders Lewis's idea of a self-governing, autarchic, de-industrialized Wales in a European Christendom was essentially an anti-revolutionary, anti-Nonconformist, anti-Atlantic ideal, based on Catholic social teaching (F.9).

**F.9**

Welsh education made foreign affinities complex. Old Testament studies and prophetic books aligned many Nonconformists with the Holy Land and quests for 'Beulah Land'. This affiliation was generally undermined by secularization, but retains some almost alarming trace-elements: Ian Paisley and Reinhard Bonnke, two highly political fundamentalists, influential respectively in Northern Ireland and Africa, trained in Welsh Bible colleges.

Llangollen International Eisteddfod. (*Source: Wales Tourist Board.*)

In Victorian Wales the public education ideal was Janus-faced. It was orientated simultaneously towards the community and the state: an Arnoldian compromise in which the 'nurturing' community was Welsh-speaking while the 'achieving' state was English-speaking. There was an attempt to get away from this in the radical wing of Plaid Cymru and the advocacy by Drs D.J. and Noelle Davies, of Scandinavian co-operation and of the educational pattern of the Danish *Folkshogskolen,* so lessening the disciplinarian 'chapel' penumbra of language, temperance and religion and leading to the more humane folk-culture of the Urdd (1932) and of the Llangollen International Eisteddfod (1947).

This is one form of Welsh cultural internationalism. Another — defining culture in its widest and least discriminating sense — has been literally dramatic. Dylan Thomas, Emlyn Williams, Tom Jones, Shirley Bassey, Geraint Evans, Gwyneth Jones, Richard Burton and Anthony Hopkins have all essentially been performers. 'There are no Welsh actors because they are all in the pulpit,' Burton said, and this suggests a way in which the secularization of chapel culture has led on to an international stage — with the male-voice choir as much as with Dylan Thomas's poems. Culture establishes itself by tours and festivals, and these create their own international network of expectation and recognition. But the Welsh 'superstars' have also created a universal-and-local image (however fabricated) which strengthens the notion of a 'national' base.

Something similar affects literature. Its scope is necessarily more restricted, but the Welsh language is linked to an international network of scholars, and Welsh writing in English is also achieving greater recognition abroad. Figures

such as Richard Hughes and R.S. Thomas address themes — environmental, psychological, political — which are recognized as universal as well as stemming from the Welsh experience. Ned Thomas, who encountered a particular political vocabulary, recognized the impact on Wales both of change in Europe and of the declining metropolitan centre (F.10). Both lay behind the foundation of the magazine *Planet* in 1971, with its strong sub-title 'The Welsh Internationalist', and its determination to remove parochialism from Wales: its vocabulary was aided by entry to Europe and by the regional conflicts in France and Spain, as well as by the increasing travails within the Soviet empire.

**F.10**

That *Planet* in its first flourishing (1971–9) coincided with the immediacy of an ecological crisis was also no coincidence. Environmental issues had high priority in Wales because the identification of language, tradition and nationalism encouraged resistance to the flooding of valleys for reservoirs and the indiscriminate planting of conifers, and because of such violent reminders of a distorted ecology as the Aberfan disaster in 1966. For all its reactionary sentimentalism, there was no escaping Richard Llewellyn's *How Green was my Valley* (1939). In turn, environmentalism went international with the involvement in Welsh affairs of 'small is beautiful' theorists such as Leopold Kohr, and the movement for alternative technology, centred at Machynlleth.

International sport generates more systematic relationships. It would be interesting to see how nations establish themselves in this way, but the pattern formed, say, by rugby must be influential, if eccentric. It takes in the 'five nations' but also South Africa and Romania — once embarrassing partners. But, unquestionably, success in it creates an international presence: New Zealand, with scarcely a million inhabitants in 1905, has demonstrated that! At the same time, British external representation in soccer and rugby reflects a pattern of organization dating from about twenty years before football was systematically structured in Europe. There were four UK nations in the World Cup pool, none of which qualified in 1994, and only one team from a united Germany: an ominous pointer? Nevertheless, the Welsh supporters with their red-and-white scarves and their singing have been a more welcome sight than some sports fans.

Then there are what A.J.P. Taylor called 'The Trouble Makers': the politicians and activists who take an active and awkward role in international affairs. Wales was not just a stamping ground for W.E. Gladstone and his great, if ambiguous theme, of 'international public right'; its earlier role in the formation of the Peace Society is obviously critical here, as is the Nonconformist commitment to pacifist principles which grew throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. Henry Richard, by no means a supporter of home rule, would probably have agreed with Victor Hugo's address to the Paris Peace Conference in 1849, although on this occasion he met the French foreign minister, Alexis de Tocqueville, who was more of a regionalist (F.11). This commitment was reinforced later in the nineteenth century by the development of the Eisteddfodau and their pan-Celtic outlook, and by European interest in Welsh art and antiquity. However, pacifist enthusiasm may have been overestimated by Nonconformity, not noticeably anti-imperialist at the time of the Boer War, and its reputation was badly disrupted by the role of Lloyd George in swinging the country behind militancy in the

**F.11**

First World War. Despite the efforts of Lord Davies of Llandinam in drumming up support for collective security, and creating the Temple of Peace and Health in Cardiff in 1938 — one may speculate what the commitment to the League of Nations Union would have looked like without him — neither Nonconformity nor Welsh pacifism was ever quite the same again.

## Junctures

Up to now I have dealt with solid interests and tendencies, modified and deflected by individuals and campaigns, but broadly stable. These were stable because they represented social and economic forces; also because the politics of the Welsh state was not sufficiently virile to deflect them. But there was a significant multiple shift in Welsh attitudes involving the foregoing factors, and more, between about 1964 and the mid-1980s, when many of the old Anglo-Welsh bonds broke down. The creation of a secretary of state for Wales did not curb nationalism, although, after Gwynfor Evans had won Plaid Cymru's first seat in 1966, George Thomas was installed by Harold Wilson precisely for that purpose. What had more repercussions was the process of UK entry into the EEC, starting — as far as Wales was concerned — with a report of the re-formed Welsh Council in 1971. Entry was negotiated diplomatically by Edward Heath in 1973 and confirmed by the referendum of 1975. In 1975, Labour in Wales was even more fiercely opposed to entry into Europe than was Transport House — and their efforts were equally fruitless.

But where did Wales fit into Europe? In the 1970s a fashionable template among some socialists and nationalists was provided by the American sociologist Michael Hechter, whose paradigm of 'internal colonialism' saw the deliberate exploitation of the country under British rule, and hypothesized this continuing into a new European peripherality, in which Wales could be equated with the Basque country, Brittany and Corsica (F.12). This played a part in the intellectual and European politics of Welsh nationalism, but in the circumstances the theory of the Scots revisionist Marxist Tom Nairn was probably more influential. In an extended essay of 1973, Nairn saw European entry as a fatal blow to the dominant British-patriotic 'establishment' of Labourism, which had habitually dissolved both class and civic consciousness into Westminster's version of the nation (F.13).

**F.12**

**F.13**



Leaflets issued during the 1975 referendum about EEC membership. (*Source: a private collection.*)

But it was notable that, after the country had voted for accession (in roughly the same proportion as the rest of the United Kingdom), the appointed Welsh Labour MEPs rapidly moved in a pro-Europe direction. Roy Jenkins was president of the Commission in 1977–81 (although there are precious few references to Wales in his voluminous diaries) and a Welsh Labour loyalist, Ivor Richard, became an EEC Commissioner in the 1980s (although his 'Wales and Europe' lecture of 1983 is no more informative in this area). However, Plaid Cymru speedily ditched its hostility and helped promote the Bureau of Unrepresented Nations, founded in Brussels in 1975. These connections survived even after the setbacks of 1979; and they helped provide international networks which could be used by Wales's new media after 1982. As European states became more decentralized in the 1980s they, and their newspapers and broadcast media, found it convenient to patronize autonomy movements in the British Isles as a means of embarrassing Mrs Thatcher, simultaneously (and illogically) arch-centralist and dismantler of the British welfare state. The irony was that Wales's alignment was more with the 'bourgeois regions' of the European 'core' than with its traditional partners on the periphery (F.14).

**F.14**

Wales's European position was significant for three reasons. First, being near to England was, for once, an advantage. Wales was closer to Heathrow than some London suburbs on the other side of the M25. Secondly, because it possessed an administrative structure of its own, it was better placed to cooperate with other European regions than were English regions, notably through its partnership agreement with Baden-Württemberg in March 1990.

Thirdly, as a land-bridge between Europe and Ireland it had at least one potential ally on developmental matters. We might also add the language: a prevalent bilingualism, or something near to it, did not seem to have done the Swiss, Scandinavians or Catalans any harm.

Can we therefore think of Wales as well as Scotland taking a special route to autonomy in Europe? Back to Lord Elis Thomas, who sees this as more the cumulative effect of administrative initiatives, political culture and policy patterns than the result of any concerted political campaign (F.6). The country's present pro-Europeanism seems to fit into two political tendencies: the drift of political power from the traditional defence-based nation-state to Brussels and to the regions, and the destruction of coercive multinationality in the former Soviet Union and its satellites.

**F.6**

Wales's current cosmopolitanism is genuine, but may also gloss over two things. The first is the international confrontation of rich and poor which Aneurin Bevan, a man who thought imaginatively about foreign policy, believed could be tackled by diverting arms accumulation into developmental measures (F.15). The role of the European region is not simply one of furthering its own development, but one of aiding the type of political development that Bevan was envisaging, through social and medical reform and intermediate technology. The second is the local breakdown to which Beatrix Campbell draws attention in her analysis of the 1991 riots in Ely, Cardiff, with their pronounced racial elements (F.16).

**F.15**

**F.16**

So it is worth thinking again about the Richard Hughes quotation (F.1) cited at the beginning of this essay. With 'post-industrialization' and the decline of the nation-state, who are now the 'we' and the 'they' in Welsh politics? Where are the dividing lines now going to occur? Where could the lava spurt on to the green Welsh grass?

**F.1**

# Sources

**F.1** . . . suppose that in the name of emergent reason the very we— they line itself within us had been deliberately so blurred and denied that the huge countervailing charges it once carried were themselves dissipated or suppressed? The normal penumbra of the self would then become a no-man's land: the whole self-conscious being has lost its footing . . . In such a state the solipsist *malgré-lui* may well turn to mad remedies, to pathological dreaming; for his struggles to regain his footing would indeed be an upheaval from being's very roots . . . gurgling up hot lava suddenly on to the green grass.

(Richard Hughes, *The Fox in the Attic*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, pp.99–100.)

**F.2** In the long and varied list of subjects chosen for the classes conducted by the University in 1948–9 the lead was taken by the language, literature and history of Wales (66), well in front of international relations (42) and economics and political science (32). In 103 of the 356 classes the language used was Welsh.

(On the Dolgellau Eisteddfod) . . . And the effect was curious. I felt I was in a foreign country, friendly but foreign. It might have been the Bernese Oberland or Czechoslovakia in its happier days.

(Sir Reginald Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism*, London, Collins, 1954, pp.341, 348.)

**F.3** The importance of inward investment to the Welsh economy should not be underestimated. By 1992 there were over 400 foreign-owned manufacturing companies in Wales, employing 70,000 people or just under 30% of the manufacturing workforce (up from 17% in 1979). Furthermore, statistical evidence contradicts the image of the 'fly-by-night' foreign concern, with overseas companies boasting higher wage levels, higher levels of investment per employee, more advanced production facilities and higher levels of value added than their domestic counterpart. This is partly due to the attraction of higher quality inward investment . . . (by) Bosch, Toyota and British Avionics . . . Sony, who began production of televisions at their Bridgend plant in 1974 . . . have undertaken a number of major expansions since then, including a major research and development centre employing over 200 graduates . . .

The fact that mere are territorial agencies or, in the case of the Welsh Office, a Ministry with full Cabinet status and a territorial remit that incorporates a wide range of functions, including that played by the Department of Trade and Industry in England, has meant that Wales has been somewhat more capable of influencing its own economic trajectory than it might otherwise have been. Certainly, these institutions are envied in comparable parts of Britain that do not possess them.

(Philip Cooke, Kevin Morgan and Adam Price, *The Welsh Renaissance: Inward Investment and Industrial Innovation*, Cardiff, Regional Industrial Research Centre for Advanced Studies, I994, pp.13, 51.)

**F.4** And as I was green and carefree, famous among the barns

About the happy yard and singing as the farm was home,

In the sun that is young once only,

Time let me play and be

Golden in the mercy of his means,

And green and golden I was huntsman and herdsman, the calves

Sang to my horn, the foxes on the hills barked clear and cold,

And the sabbath rang slowly

In the pebbles of the holy streams.

(Dylan Thomas, from 'Fern Hill', in *Collected Poems 1934–1952*, London, J.M. Dent, 1952, p.159.)

**F.5** Wales

An independent pamphlet of creative work by the younger progressive Welsh writers.

British culture is a fact, but the English contribution to it is very small. MacDiarmid told the Scots that they could gain nothing by joining forces with the English and aping their mannerisms.

There is actually no such thing as 'English' culture: a few individuals may be highly cultivated, but the people as a whole are crass.

Welsh culture is carried on, not by a clique of moneyed dilettantes, but by the small shopkeeper, the blacksmith, the non-conformist minister, by the miners, quarrymen, and the railwaymen.

The Kelt's heritage is clear as sunlight, yet the burden of English literature has also fallen on him. The greatest of present-day poets are Kelts.

We publish this journal in English so that it may spread far beyond the frontier of Wales, and because we realize the beauty of the English language better than the English themselves, who have so shamefully misused it.

We are beyond the bigotry of unintelligent fascist nationalism. In case the English should claim our contribution for their own, we produce this pamphlet, calling it 'Wales' in defiance of parasitic adoption.

Though we write in English, we are rooted in Wales.

(Keidrich Rhys, *Wales*, No. 1, Summer 1937.)

**F.6** The most striking feature of the Welsh Office for Welsh media watchers is that it has become the most prominent place in Wales in which to protest. Demonstrations about everything from the government's policy in the Middle East and the Gulf War across to the closure of the smallest one-class primary school, not to mention health services, farming, chemical pollution, the poll tax, higher education cuts, all these conflicts about power and resources in and against the political system are acted out in front of that building. This is the actually existing government of Wales. It is the state of Wales. Secretaries of State for Wales, particularly the previous incumbent (Peter Walker), acted as if they were prime ministers of Wales. Flanked by motor-cycle outriders speeding out of Stuttgart Airport, on yet another European high tech trail. And what were these outriders there to protect him against?

(Dafydd Elis Thomas, Lord Nant Conwy, 'The Constitution of Wales', in Bernard Crick (ed.), *National Identities*, Oxford, Political Quarterly/Blackwell, 1991, p.65.)

**F.7** Some kind of human society, though God knows what kind, will no doubt go on occupying these two western peninsulas of Britain, but that people, who are my people and no mean people, who have for a millennium and a half lived in them as Welsh people, are nothing but a naked people under an acid rain.

(Gwyn A. Williams, *When Was Wales?*, London, Black Raven Press, 1985, p.305.)

**F.8** If I had to use a label of any kind, I should have to call myself a **F.8** unionist. I believe that the emancipation of the class which I have come to this House to represent, unapologetically, can best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic unit, by which I mean a unit where we can have a brotherhood of all nations and have the combined strength of working class people throughout the whole of the United Kingdom brought to bear against any bully, any Executive, any foreign power, any bureaucratic arrangement, be it in Brussels or in Washington, and any would-be colonialist, either an industrial colonialist or a political colonialist.

(Neil Kinnock MP, in *Hansard,* 3 February 1975, cited in John Osmond, 'Wales in the 1980s', in Charles R. Foster (ed.), *Nations without a State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1980, p.48.)

**F.9** As Wales has been ruined from without, so it can only be restored from within . . . The entire natural resources of Wales are to be carefully developed in the interests of the Welsh people and to assist her neighbours in other parts of the world . . . It is the small successful countries of Europe, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, who stir our emulation, because they have all been faced with crises similar to ours, and have shown us by their example how such crises may be overcome.

(J.E. Daniel, *Welsh Nationalism: What it Stands for*, London, Foyle's Welsh Co., 1937, p.50 ff.)

**F.10** I had grown up with the word extremist almost constantly in my newspaper — Kenya, Cyprus, Israel, Malaya, Aden; very often the word changed to terrorist and then one day the words would disappear and the head of a new independent state would arrive in London to meet the Queen.

(Ned Thomas, *The Welsh Extremist*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1971, p.1.)

**F.11** A day will come when you, Russia — you, Italy — you, England — you, Germany — all of you, will, without losing your distinctive qualities and glorious individuality, be blended into a superior unity, and constitute a European fraternity, just as Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy and Lorraine have been blended into France.

(Henry Richard quoting Victor Hugo addressing the Paris International Peace Conference, 1849, cited in Goronwy J. Jones, *Wales and the Quest for Peace*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1969, p.21.)

**F.12** Commerce and trade among members of the periphery tend to be monopolised by members of the core. Credit is similarly monopolised. When commercial prospects emerge, bankers, managers and entrepreneurs tend to be recruited from the core. The peripheral economy is forced into complementary development to the core, and

thus becomes dependent on external markets, when this economy rests on a single primary export, either agricultural or mineral. The movement of peripheral labour is determined solely by forces exogamous to the periphery. Typically there is great migration and mobility of peripheral workers in response to price fluctuations of exported primary products. Economic dependency is reinforced through judicial, political and military measures. There is relative lack of services, lower standards of living, and higher levels of frustration, measured by such indicators as alcoholism among members of the peripheral collectivity. There is national discrimination on the basis of language, religion, or, in general, ethnicity. Thus the structural differences between groups are causally linked to cultural differences.

(Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, London, Routledge, 1975, pp.33–4.)

**F.13** Labourism stands not for class and nation — that is the ideological halo — but for class-in-nation; or more exactly, for nation-over-class. Labourism is (to employ one of its own historic programme-words in a different sense) the Nationalisation of class . . .

Labourism constitutes, perhaps, the most important element in the astonishing homogeneity of modern Britain. In effect, the most dangerous seam of civil society, the division between the classes, runs through it rather than outside it and is constantly 'healed' (that is, kept closed) by the very structure and world-view of the party . . .

The Labour Left almost never stands for class against nation, for the material reality of which Labourism is the mystical shell.

Were it so, the Labour Party could not exist in its actual form, and would certainly never have survived the trials of the past twenty years without a split.

(Tom Nairn, *The Left against Europe*, London, Pelican, 1973, pp.51–4.)

**F.14** Within Europe, what makes for a politically assertive region? In the sixties and seventies there was a great deal of protest in areas that perceived themselves as poor, peripheral and colonised but which had a cultural movement — Wales, Brittany, Occitania (Spain offered a different context when minority nationalities asserted themselves explosively after the end of the Franco regime) . . .

But today in Western Europe, we see the rise of a different kind of regionalism. In Italy in the recent elections the good showing of the Lega Lombarda asserts a rich region's unwillingness to subsidise the poor south and the corrupt bureaucracy of Rome. The arguments are not dissimilar from those which fuelled the Slovene and Croatian critique of the old Yugoslavia — they wanted to join the richer West and have now succeeded in getting half way there.

(Ned Thomas, 'Post-Election Blues and Greens and Reds: Political Trends in the New Europe', *Planet*, No.93, June/July 1992, pp.5–6

**F.15** We are not in a situation where great empires are quarrelling about spoil and inheriting the corpses of those they have extinguished . . .

The great powers of today, as they look at the armaments they have built up, find themselves hopelessly frustrated. If that be the case, what is the use of speaking about first, second and third class powers? That is surely the wrong language to use. It does not comply with contemporary reality. What we have to seek are new ways of being great, new modes of pioneering, new fashions of thought, new means of inspiring and igniting the minds of mankind. We can do so.

(Aneurin Bevan in the House of Commons, 19 December 1956, *Hansard*, Vol. 562, cols.1398–1407).)

F.16 What vexed all the ‘authorities’ was what to do about a crowd that thought it was simply claiming the right of congregation, the right to own its own space. The Rev. Robert Morgan remembered the atmosphere as being like ‘a rave, a scene’. For all the sense of festivity, people were throwing bottles at Waheed’s shop and singing ‘Old MacDonald had a farm’ at the police. It was also a crowd whose presence had a purpose — it wanted to torch a neighbour.

(Beatrix Campbell, *Goliath: Britain’s Dangerous Places*, London, Methuen, 1993, p.21.)