The moral equality of combatants
◄Previous: The voluntariness argument

# Conclusion

In this course we have looked at the arguments for and against a doctrine known as the moral equality of combatants. The moral equality of combatants says that combatants on both sides of a war, regardless of the justice of their cause, are equally permitted to kill each other and equally liable to be killed. We looked at Walzer’s argument for moral equality from the right to self-defence, and then at McMahan’s arguments against this. Finally, we considered Hurka’s argument that the moral equality of combatants follows from the fact that, in joining up, they voluntarily surrender their rights.

The following table, which gives some of the arguments and locates some of the theorists in relation to those arguments, will help you to draw all this information together.

##

Arguments for MEC | Accepts | Rejects
--- | --- | ---
Material non-innocence | Walzer | McMahan, Hurka
Voluntariness | Walzer, Hurka | McMahan
Epistemological argument | Walzer | McMahan
Protection of non-combatants on the unjust side |  | McMahan

◄Contents►Next: Reading 1 Walzer on the moral equality of soldiers

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