# 5.1 Are racial fetishes racist?

There are cases that seem straightforwardly racist: for example, yelling a racial slur at someone of another race in order to frighten them. There are also cases that seem straightforwardly not racist, which all or most accounts of racism will identify as not instances of racism. However, there is also a grey area: cases which there may be significant disagreements about whether or not they count as racist. Philosophers have tried to rationally analyse some of these cases and provide arguments to resolve these disputes. Racial fetishes are an example that falls into this grey area. Racial fetishes are exclusive or near-exclusive sexual or romantic preferences for people of a race other than someone’s own.

In this section you will watch a conversation with Dr Robin Zheng, who is a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Dr Zheng is an expert on issues of moral responsibility and social inequality. The conversation focuses on the argument in her 2016 paper ‘Why yellow fever isn’t flattering: A case against racial fetishes’. In the first part, Dr Zheng discusses what racial fetishes are, and outlines a common argument made in defence of racial fetishes.

## Argument Structure

As you will see in the video, Dr Zheng describes the Mere Preferences Argument as having two premises and a conclusion. The conclusion of an argument is the claim that the argument is trying to support. The premises of the argument are the reasons being offered to support the conclusion. In everyday life, people might express arguments as continuous text or sentences. For example, ‘Aparna cannot vote yet, she’s only 17’. Philosophers often present arguments in a way that makes the structure of the argument explicit, like this:

Premise 1 Aparna is 17

Premise 2 17 year olds cannot vote

Conclusion Aparna cannot vote

Bad arguments can be bad because one or more of their premises are false, or because the reasoning from the premises to the conclusion is faulty (i.e., the premises being true does not guarantee that the conclusion is true).

In the argument above, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises (if 17 year olds cannot vote, and if Aparna is 17, then it must be the case that Aparna cannot vote). Whether this argument is successful or not will therefore depend on whether both its premises are true (for example, where or not Aparna is in fact 17).

Being able to figure out the structure of an argument puts you in a good position to begin evaluating an argument, spotting where the argument might go wrong, and making up your own mind about whether you accept the argument or not.

In this section you will examine the Mere Preferences Argument in defence of racial fetishes, and Dr Zheng’s argument against it.

## Activity 8

Spend about twenty minutes on this activity

Watch the following video.

This browser does not support video playback.

Transcript

After watching the video, answer the following questions. You may need to watch the video again.

1. Drag and drop the premises and conclusion of the Mere Preferences Argument into the correct slots.

Premise 2

Preferences for racialised physical traits are not different from preferences for non-racialised physical traits.

Conclusion

‘Mere’ preferences for racialised physical traits are not morally objectionable.

Premise 1

There is nothing morally objectionable about sexual preferences for hair colour, eye colour, and other non-racialised physical traits.

Using the following two lists, match each numbered item with the correct letter.

1. Premise 2

2. Conclusion

3. Premise 1

1. 1

   Preferences for racialised physical traits are not different from preferences for non-racialised physical traits.

2. 2

   ‘Mere’ preferences for racialised physical traits are not morally objectionable.

3. 3

   There is nothing morally objectionable about sexual preferences for hair colour, eye colour, and other non-racialised physical traits.

The correct answers are:

- 1 =
- 2 =
- 3 =

The Mere Preferences Argument is an argument that concludes that racial fetishes are not morally objectionable. As racism is generally understood to be morally objectionable, if racial fetishes are not morally objectionable then they cannot be instances of racism.

In the next part of the conversation Dr Zheng outlines three possible strategies for challenging the premises of the Mere Preferences Argument, including the strategy that she herself adopts.

## Activity 9

Spend about twenty five minutes on this activity

Watch the following video.

This browser does not support video playback.

Transcript

After watching the video, answer the following questions. You may need to watch the video again, pausing as you go.

1. Dr Zheng describes three possible strategies for challenging the Mere Preferences Argument: a challenge to the first premise, and two challenges to the second premise. What is the challenge to the second premise that she does not pursue, as she thinks it doesn’t go far enough?

(A text entry box would appear here, but your browser does not support it.)

### Discussion

1. The challenge to the second premise that Dr Zheng does not pursue is that preferences for racialised physical traits are different to preferences for non-racialised physical traits because racialised physical traits are always connected to racist stereotypes.

2. Dr Zheng’s strategy is to challenge the second premise by focusing on the effects of racial fetishes. She suggests there are two important differences between racialised and nonracialised physical traits. What are these differences?

(A text entry box would appear here, but your browser does not support it.)
1. 2.

### Discussion

1. Preferences for racialised physical traits produce unfair burdens on the targets of the racial fetish. For example, East Asian women report feeling doubt, suspicion, or insecurity when dating, because they are not sure whether someone is interested in them as an individual or because of their race. They feel homogenised (just one of a group), or otherised (they are held to a different standard to others).

2. Preferences for racialised physical traits contribute to the idea that there are racial differences in general and that we should treat different races differently.

OpenLearn - What can philosophy tell us about race?
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