Part II: A strategy for elucidating non-natural meaning

I do not propose to consider any further theories of the “causal-tendency” type. I suspect no such theory could avoid difficulties analogous to those I have outlined without utterly losing its claim to rank as a theory of this type.

I will now try a different and, I hope, more promising line. If we can elucidate the meaning of

“\(x\) meant\(_{\text{un}}\) something (on a particular occasion)” and
“\(x\) meant\(_{\text{un}}\) that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)”

and of

“A meant\(_{\text{un}}\) something by \(x\) (on a particular occasion)” and
“A meant\(_{\text{un}}\) by \(x\) that so-and-so (on a particular occasion),”

this might reasonably be expected to help us with

“\(x\) means\(_{\text{un}}\) (timeless) something (that so-and-so),”
“A means\(_{\text{un}}\) (timeless) by \(x\) something (that so-and-so),”

and with the explication of “means the same as,” “understands,” “entails,” and so on. Let us for the moment pretend that we have to deal only with utterances which might be informative or descriptive.

[...]