Time | Key periods | Key events |
1368–1644 | Ming dynasty | 1402–1424 Yongle Emperor, Zhu Di |
1792–1911 | Feudal decay in China, rise of European colonialism | 1840s–1850s The Opium Wars and advent of unequal treaties; 1899–1900 Boxer Rebellion |
1911–1937 | Nationalist rule under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-Shek | 1931 Japanese invade Manchuria; 1934–1935 The Long March; 1937 Japanese invasion; |
1937–1945 | Fighting between China and Japan | 1945 Defeat of Japan |
1949–1953 | Communist revolution, Chiang Kai-Shek retreats to Taiwan | 1950–1953 Korean War |
1953–1964 | Mass collectivisation and rural industrialisation | 1953–1955 Taiwan straights crisis, United States threatens nuclear strike on China; 1954 Taiwan–United States mutual defence treaty; 1955 Bandung Conference (the Asian-African Conference); 1960–1961 Famine; 1960 Split with Soviet Union; 1964 China successful atomic test |
political campaigns | 1971 Rapprochement between United States and China; 1972 China takes UN Security Council Seat, Nixon visit to China; 1975 Support for Khmer Rouge in Cambodia; 1976 Mao Zedong dies | |
opening up to international economy | 1979 War with Vietnam; 1979 Full US recognition of PRC; 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, fall of Berlin Wall; 1991 End of Cold War; 1996 Free elections in Taiwan; 1997 China reclaims Hong Kong; 1999 NATO accidentally bombs Chinese embassy in Belgrade; 2000 United States normalises trade relations with China; 2001 China joins World Trade Organization; 2005 US Secretary of State Robert Zoellick urges China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in international affairs; 2007 China increases defence spending by 18 per cent; 2008 China becomes United States’ largest creditor; 2010 China becomes world’s second largest economy, overtaking Japan; 2011 US strategic ‘pivot towards Asia’ |
Observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, remain free of ambition, never claim leadership. (Deng Xiaoping, cited in Foot, 2006, p. 84)
[China will] transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, as well as the Cold War mentality that defined international relations along ideological lines. China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War. … China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs. It advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations. China’s development depends on world peace – a peace that its development will in turn reinforce. (2005, p. 24)
it is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China. In fact, the structural imperatives of the international system, which are powerful, will probably force the United States to abandon its policy of constructive engagement in the near future. Mearsheimer (2001, pp. 401–402)
China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely – eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today’s Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join … If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph. (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 23)
in an interconnected world, power does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another. Cultivating spheres of cooperation – not competing spheres of influence – will lead to progress in the Asia Pacific. Now, as with any nation, America will approach China with a focus on our interests. And it’s precisely for this reason that it is important to pursue pragmatic cooperation with China on issues of mutual concern … That’s why we welcome China’s effort to play a greater role on the world stage – a role in which their growing economy is joined by growing responsibility. … So the United States does not seek to contain China, nor does a deeper relationship with China mean a weakening of our bilateral alliances. On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations. … Of course, we will not agree on every issue, and the United States will never waver in speaking up for the fundamental values that we hold dear – and that includes respect for the religion and cultures of all people – because support for human rights and human dignity is ingrained in America. But we can move these discussions forward in a spirit of partnership rather than rancor. (Obama, 2009)
Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries … [but] we must be careful not to define interdependence entirely in terms of situations of evenly balanced mutual dependence. It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence to actors in their dealings with one another. (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 7 and 9)
Year | China annual increase in GDP % | United States annual increase in GDP % |
---|---|---|
1990 | 3.8 | 1.9 |
1995 | 10.9 | 2.5 |
2000 | 8.4 | 4.2 |
2005 | 11.3 | 3.1 |
2010 | 10.4 | 3.0 |
Driven by an interest in survival, states are acutely sensitive to any erosion of their relative capabilities, which are the ultimate basis for their security in an anarchical, self-help international context. (1993, p. 127)
even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their co-operation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. … a state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself. That is the first way in which the structure of international politics limits the co-operation of states. (1979, pp. 105–106)
As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia–Pacific region. (Clinton, 2011, p. 56)
China | US | |
Defence budget 2010-11, $bn | 89.8 | 739.3 |
Share of GDP, % | 1.3* | 4.9 |
Active personnel, m | 2.3 | 1.6 |
Strategic and long-range assets | ||
Intercontinental ballistic missile launchers | 66 | 450 |
Bombers | 132 | 155 |
Nuclear-powered submarines w/ ballistic missiles | 3 | 14 |
Manoeuvre** | ||
Modern main battle tanks | 2800 | 6302 |
Armoured infantry fighting vehicles | 2390 | 6452 |
4th generation tactical aircraft | 747 | 3092 |
Attack helicopters | 16 | 862 |
Heavy/medium transport helicopters | 294 | 2809 |
Power projection | ||
Cruiser/destroyers | 13 | 83 |
Aircraft carriers | 0 | 11 |
Frigates | 65 | 28 |
Nuclear-powered submarines | 5 | 57 |
Principal amphibious ships | 1 | 29 |
Heavy/medium transport aircraft | 57 | 847 |
Tanker aircraft | 13 | 550 |
ISTAR‡ | ||
AWACS† | 14 | 104 |
Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles | n/a | 370 |
Imagery satellites | 15 | 10 |
Intelligence satellites | 11 | 20 |
Navigational satellites | 10 | 31 |
The confluence of media hyperventilation over China’s inexorable rise to global preeminence and U.S. politicians’ habits of scapegoating China for their own failures spawned a popular impression of China as an adversary in a zero-sum game. In that game, exports are considered Team America’s points, imports are Team China’s points, and the trade account is the scoreboard. Since the scoreboard showed a deficit, the United States was portrayed as losing at trade and it was losing because China perpetually cheats. (Ikenson, 2013)
Currency manipulation, subsidization of industry, dumping, intellectual property theft, discrimination against imports, forced technology transfer, indigenous innovation policies, raw material export restrictions, and other allegations of cheating came to define Chinese trade practices. … Of course, some of the allegations had merit. (Ikenson, 2013)
Both sides commit to further strengthen capacity building in, and resources devoted to, law enforcement against intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement. China is to improve IPR related laws and regulations and study further strengthening of measures for the pursuit of criminal liability for IPR infringement. (US Department of the Treasury, 2012)
China's primary goal in the conference: to block any proposal that threatened its capacity to expand. Negotiators played the conference like a football team intent on a 0–0 draw. Their strategy was defensive, their tactics were tough and their tackling of opponents occasionally brutal …With the support of other emerging economies – India, Brazil and South America – they shot down all attempts to make emissions cuts legally binding or to set long–term goals for reducing greenhouse gases. (Watts, 2009)
The axis of authoritarianism shares a distinctive approach to the world that contrasts sharply with liberal attitudes … A world in which the authoritarian powers wield considerably more influence looks very different from the years 1991–2008, when the world order was informally based on two central facts – American power and globalization. (2010, p. 239)