Transcript
WILLIAM BROWN
In this audio we are going to explore in a bit more detail how African states might respond to, and seek to benefit from, the increase in great power competition in the continent. And to do this, I am joined by two leading experts on Africa’s international relations. First, Dr Frangton Chiyemura, lecturer in International Development at The Open University.
FRANGTON CHIYEMURA
Hello.
WILLIAM BROWN
And second, Dr Folashadé Soulé from the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University.
FOLASHADÉ SOULÉ
Hello.
WILLIAM BROWN
So, let’s begin with the context that is important here – an increasing involvement and competition between great powers in African countries. This is often approached by thinking about what those external powers, the United States, China and others, are doing and their motives, but Frangton, why is it important to look at this case from the perspective of African countries? What does that add to the picture?
FRANGTON CHIYEMURA
Well, thanks, Will, for this. I think in contemporary international relations, the influence of African countries on great power rivalry is something of importance to us. The evolving dynamics of great power rivalry in Africa present an opportunity for African countries to potentially reshape their role in the international system, moving from the periphery to a more central position in global affairs. This introduces a new perspective, particularly one that considers African countries not merely as victims or passive actors within the international system, but instead positions them as shapers of international relations. If managed effectively, this rivalry presents several opportunities to African countries. Among these opportunities is the diversification of development partnerships. For instance, the growing economic presence of China in Africa has prompted Western powers to reassess their engagement with the continent. As a result, African countries are strategically playing these partners against each other to extract more benefits. Rwanda, for example, has adeptly managed relations with various partners – including China, the United States and the European Union – to support its ambitious development goals. Kenya, on the other hand, has successfully balanced its relationships with both China and the United States, attracting infrastructure investments from China while maintaining strong security ties with the United States. Zimbabwe, another interesting case study, has managed to play off Western powers against China and Russia, extracting economic benefits and political support. Beyond the diversification of development partners, this great power rivalry further offers an opportunity for African states to assert strategic influence on international issues, events and policies. South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia’s roles in the BRICS+ alliance and the African Union’s addition to the G20 attest to an increased leverage of African actors in pursuing strategic interests within the international system. For instance, the African Group has maintained a united stance on climate negotiations, demanding greater commitment from developed nations, exemplifying growing assertiveness in international relations. However, it is crucial to acknowledge the potential downsides of this great power competition in Africa. There are concerns that the second scramble for influence in Africa could mirror, albeit in a more nuanced form, the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 1885, which led to the partition of Africa among European powers. The risk lies in African countries becoming pawns in a larger geopolitical competition, potentially compromising their sovereignty and long-term strategic interests.
WILLIAM BROWN
Thanks, Frangton, and it’s important to bring in those kind of historical perspectives as well. But you used the term ‘scramble for Africa’ and this is widely used in writing about this contemporary era of great power competition. But Folashadé, you’ve been critical of calling this a scramble for Africa, can you explain why?
FOLASHADÉ SOULÉ
Thank you. Well, the ‘scramble’, the initial ‘scramble’ for Africa, refers to the colonial competition for territorial establishment in Africa in the nineteenth century, epitomised by the Berlin Conference of 1884, as Frangton just mentioned, and that conference formalised and legitimised the idea of the continent as a playground and territory for external powers to pursue colonisation. But in a contemporary context where there is no longer an African country under colonial rule, it is questionable why the ‘scramble for Africa’ narrative is resurgent. Now, there are some common themes behind this narrative. The Berlin Conference brought together colonial powers with competing interests. The contemporary narrative around a ‘new scramble’ is constructed around similar lines of competition and geopolitical rivalry among great powers in Africa and largely focuses on the US–China–Russia rivalry on the continent. But I think that it is important and necessary to question this ‘new scramble’ narrative. As it too often descentres African actors from the narrative and lacks investigation on their motives and strategies for choosing their partners. So, instead of solely focusing on how external power rivalry is taking place on the continent, it is equally important to put African actors back at the centre and as key agents of the decision-making process in analysis, instead of stripping away their agency by focusing too much on how Africa is acted upon or as a commodity subject to competition. So our focus on agency is particularly relevant here as it allows us to understand how African agents are strategizing and using these various spaces and opportunities for their own interest.
WILLIAM BROWN
Thanks, Folashadé, those are really key points. But this competition has the potential to open opportunities for African states. Folashadé, if we think about the continent as a whole what are the diplomatic opportunities that might open up for African states?
FOLASHADÉ SOULÉ
Dealing with great power rivalry doesn’t necessitate to get involved into a zero-sum game by choosing one partner over the other for geopolitical reasons. So, for African states, the best way to get the most out of this competition is to determine how engagement with competing partners fits best African governments’ national development priorities.
WILLIAM BROWN
And for individual states, Frangton, there’s scope to play external powers off against each other, for example, in the UN, and seek gains from doing that kind of diplomatic activity.
FRANGTON CHIYEMURA
Absolutely, Will, and I think, because of Zimbabwe, it’s something with interest in looking at in this particular example. I think Zimbabwe is one of the few African countries that has been under US-led sanctions since 2001 and it has managed to navigate this challenge with some success by leveraging this geopolitical rivalry between China and Russia, on one side, and the USA and its allies, on the other side. So these sanctions have led to Zimbabwe’s international isolation. However, this isolation has also prompted Zimbabwe to seek alternative partnerships, initially with Russia and then later with China. Primarily for economic and political support reasons. So, Zimbabwe, by aligning diplomatically, politically and economically with China and Russia, it has been able to partially mitigate the impact of sanctions while securing economic benefits and political backing in international forums such as the United Nations.
WILLIAM BROWN
From the point of view of external powers, much of the competition centres on the pursuit of economic gains, access to supplies of commodities – oil, cobalt and other minerals – as well as seeing African states as potentially lucrative markets for exports. But are there opportunities for economic development also for African states?
FOLASHADÉ SOULÉ
African countries are in competition to attract foreign investment and the multiplication of ‘Africa+1’ platforms offers a venue to promote their countries as the best environment for these investments. But competition is not only economic, it’s also political. African politicians and political parties also need to demonstrate their capacity to deliver their electoral promises at home. So providing hard infrastructure to targeted communities and localities becomes a key determinant for these political actors to gain votes, especially in democratic settings, but also in autocratic settings where delivering infrastructure is often considered by the presidency as a means to legitimise the government’s action and to address growing dissatisfaction by civil society movements. But beyond government actors, it’s also important to look at non-state actors. African governments might benefit from taking into account their own citizens’ opinions on great power rivalry in Africa, especially on US–China competition. A survey conducted by Afrobarometer across 34 countries, between 2019 and mid-2021, showed that on average 62 per cent of those that were surveyed see China’s influence in Africa as positive and 60 per cent consider US influence to be equally positive. So this suggests that for many ordinary African citizens, US–China rivalry may not be an either/or proposition but rather a win-win opportunity.
WILLIAM BROWN
Okay, thank you, Folashadé, But Frangton, from a state’s point of view, what are the dangers in playing this kind of game and how might they be overcome?
FRANGTON CHIYEMURA
Thanks, Will, for this. I think African countries face potential challenges, particularly in navigating this great power competition. There is a risk of African countries becoming pawns in this great power competition, and there are also concerns about proxy conflicts, exploitation and exacerbation of existing divisions and tensions within African countries. These issues could compromise African sovereignty and hinder economic development goals.
WILLIAM BROWN
Thank you. And to round off this discussion, I think it has highlighted how African states and leaders are key actors in international relations alongside the great powers. And it’s shown how the importance of viewing IR from multiple perspectives, in this case, prioritising a view from African states to see how the issues and debates raised by great power competition can be viewed differently. I’d like to finish by inviting Frangton and Folashadé, just to offer some final thoughts.
FRANGTON CHIYEMURA
Well, thanks Will, and Fola, for this interesting conversation. I think it is important that international relations is relations really of different actors from different places in the world. And this great power competition is indeed a perfect opportunity through which African countries can recentre themselves within the international system.
WILLIAM BROWN
And Folashadé?
FOLASHADÉ SOULÉ
Thank you both. I also think that it’s important to analyse Africa’s international relations from different perspectives and different angles, and looking at the strategies carried out by various actors. This allows for a complete overview, and also strategies and tensions of, these actors while carrying out their international relations.
WILLIAM BROWN
Thank you both. All that remains is to thank you, Frangton and Folashadé, for your insights into this example of contemporary international relations.