Stage Five of Genocide: Organization
The fifth stage of genocide according to the Genocide Watch outline is organization. The definition of this stage as provided by President Gregory Stanton is as follows:
➔ 5. ORGANIZATION: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility. (An example is the Sudanese government’s support and arming of the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants during Indian partition) or decentralized (jihadist terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Arms are purchased by states and militias, often in violation of UN Arms Embargos, to facilitate acts of genocide. States organize secret police to spy on, arrest, torture, and murder people suspected of opposition to political leaders. Special training is given to murderous militias and special army killing units.
State sponsored organization is a common trend when evaluating genocides throughout history. Most notably, Nazi Germany utilized government resources to displace, detain, and execute millions of people as a result of their religion, sexuality, mental health, and physical health. Likewise, the Sudanese government funded and supported a militia group known as the Janjaweed to terrorize and murder primarily African resisters of the government. In the Encyclopedia Britannica article below, you will read further on the organization of the Sudanese government against Africans in Darfur.
Janjaweed: SUDANESE MILITIA
By: Michael Ray
Janjaweed, also spelled Janjawid, Arab militia active in Sudan, particularly in the Darfur region. The militia’s name is thought by many to be derived from the Arabic jinnī (spirit) and jawad (horse), although its etymological origins are not completely clear.
The Janjaweed has its origins in the long-running civil war that gripped one of Sudan’s neighbours, Chad. Another neighbour, Libya, intervened in the conflict in 1980. To supplement its own forces in the region, Libya provided material support to Arab nomads in eastern Chad. Across the border in Darfur, the Sudanese government gave arms and ammunition to Arabic-speaking Abbala nomads and enlisted them to act as an armed deterrent against Chadian incursions into Sudan during that time. Those two groups would later form the basis of the Janjaweed.
Although a truce brought Libyan intervention in Chad to an end in 1987, by then civil war had resumed in Sudan, as sporadic fighting between the south and the north gave way to a full rebellion in 1983. The overlapping conflicts provided continuous circumstances under which the militias could operate. Over the following decade, the two armed Arab groups formed a loose coalition. The militias raided villages along the Chad-Sudan border throughout the 1990s, but the violence derived primarily from clashes between farmers and pastoralists over land and water rights. The attitude of the Sudanese government in Khartoum toward the militias ranged from tacit support, as the government provided the militias with supplies so they could supplement the Sudanese army in its fight against the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, to benevolent neglect, as the government did little to halt the banditry in which the militias engaged.
The nature of militia activity in Darfur took on a new dimension in 2003. Beginning in 2002, rebels from Darfur’s sedentary agriculturalist population (primarily African groups), protesting what they contended was unfair treatment by the Arab-dominated Sudanese government, conducted strikes on government installations. The Sudanese armed forces retaliated with devastating aerial bombardments of rebel strongholds. Two of the most prominent rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), mounted a joint raid on the Sudanese air base at Al-Fāshir in April 2003, destroying aircraft and capturing dozens of prisoners. The Al-Fāshir raid was a psychological blow to the government in Khartoum, and the SLA pressed its advantage, scoring a string of victories against the Sudanese military. In response, the Arab militias—now referred to collectively as the Janjaweed—were organized as a counterinsurgency force. Supplied with arms and communications equipment by Sudanese military intelligence, the highly mobile Janjaweed forces turned the tide of battle in Darfur. They routed the SLA and conducted what was described by international observers as an ethnic cleansing of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. A typical Janjaweed raid would open with an attack by the Sudanese air force, with helicopter gunships or Antonov bombers targeting civilian settlements. Within hours, mounted Janjaweed would sweep into the area, killing and mutilating the men, raping the women, and killing or kidnapping the children. The raiders would then destroy the basic necessities of village life—burning fields and houses, poisoning wells, and seizing anything of value. Between 2003 and 2008, hundreds of thousands were killed and millions were displaced as the Janjaweed targeted civilian populations across Darfur.
The Janjaweed’s campaign, which was characterized as genocide by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2004, drew international condemnation, but the government of Sudanese Pres. Omar Hassan al-Bashir denied any connection between itself and the Janjaweed. Some 7,000 troops under the banner of the African Union (AU) were dispatched to Darfur in 2004, but the force was too small to act as an effective deterrent to the Janjaweed’s continued attacks. The AU presence was bolstered by a United Nations peacekeeping contingent in 2008, and the combined force, which swelled to more than 22,000, curtailed Janjaweed activity in Darfur.References: