10 Lessons from the past: public order policing

There is a tendency to view riots and violent public disorder as exceptional in British society but, in fact, they are a constant, if infrequent, occurrence. Violent public disorder has a range of political, economic and social triggers. These often include high unemployment or prices, a desire for a greater voice in politics, the expression of extremist political ideas, social conflicts (primarily racism) and responses to particular police actions.

Figure 14: Riot police push back anti-migration protestors in Rotherham, 2024 [Description: Photograph taken from a bus shelter with smashed out windows of a long line of police in riot gear with shields raised. The police are facing away from the camera and groups of people are just visible behind them. The location is in Rotherham and appears to be a housing estate.] Source: https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/riot-police-officers-push-back-anti-migration-protesters-news-photo/2165278547?adppopup=true

Before the advent of modern policing, magistrates and the military were responsible for the control of public order. This often led to confrontation and violence. Gradually, the ‘New Police’ assumed responsibility for policing large-scale protests and disorder, initially sharing this with the military. During the early decades of the twentieth century police tactics were initially rudimentary but went on to evolve into forms we recognise today.

After the Second World War, the police assumed sole responsibility for policing public order and, up until the end of the 1960s, used minimum force so as to win public sympathy for the police. The 1970s and 1980s saw a shift towards more paramilitary approaches to riot control, drawing on colonial policing tactics, in response to the targeting of police during public violence. The confrontations produced by this ‘militarisation’ of public order policing has, in recent decades, dictated a shift back towards ‘negotiated management’.

What relevance does this long history, containing both successes and failures, have to public order policing today? Arguably, three ‘lessons’ might be discerned.

1. Violent public disorder is not exceptional – it is a routine, if relatively infrequent, part of policing. The police are often held responsible for public order, but history shows that outbreaks of serious public violence are cyclical and caused by deep social factors well beyond the control of the police. The police’s ability to maintain public order is limited. Violent disorder is therefore not necessarily the result of police failure or poor policing. When riots do start, their course is inherently unpredictable and even good tactics and preparation can go awry.
2. That said, there was a notable shift in the 1970s from public disorders which were the result of protestor clashes and social discontent, towards public disorders where violence was purposefully directed against the police due to perceptions of politically biased and racist daily policing. Analysis of riots from the 1970s onwards shows that public order policing is often linked to the standards and conduct of daily policing. Biased or poor daily policing, particularly of marginalised and underprivileged communities, can be a factor in precipitating public violence.
3. Overall, the ‘balance sheet’ of public order policing shows this to be an area of considerable police innovation and success. Since assuming responsibility for public order policing in the 1930s, the police have continued to develop and hone tactics, equipment and command and control processes. The militarisation of public order policing in the 1980s proved to be counterproductive to order and a significant misstep. However, the current ‘negotiated management’ approach – blending use of force where necessary with tact and procedural justice where possible – generally produces better results.