This content is associated with The Open University's BA (Honours) History qualification.
Schlieffen’s idea was perfected in the winter of 1905 when, as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, Russia was eliminated as a serious threat to the European status quo for the foreseeable future. It would first of all have to recover from a lost war and from revolution. For those in Germany and Austria-Hungary who feared Russia and its ally France as potential future enemies, this was a perfect time to consider ‘preventive war’.
Such a war aimed to unleash a war while Russia was still weak. In the not too distant future, Germany’s military planners predicted, Russia would become invincible. This was a fear shared by other governments, but in Britain and France it had led to the decision to seek friendlier relations with Russia.
The new Entente between Britain and France was only just being shown to be effective following the First Moroccan Crisis. As a result of the Crisis Germany began to feel the full effects of her own expansionist foreign policy. To Germany, British involvement in a future war now seemed almost certain.
One consequence would be that Italy, allied to Germany and Austria since 1882, would become a less reliable ally. In a war involving Britain, Italy would be unable to defend its long coastlines and might therefore opt to stay neutral in a future war.
The international events of 1905-06 marked the beginning of Germany’s perceived ‘encirclement’ by alliances of possible future enemies against her. Between this time and the outbreak of war in 1914, the General Staff became more concerned about the increasing military strength of Germany’s enemies.
Schlieffen saw Germany’s best chance of victory in a swift offensive in the West, against France, while in the East, the German army was initially to be on the defensive. Russia would be dealt with after France had been delivered a decisive blow. In effect, Schlieffen aimed to turn the inescapable reality that Germany would have to fight a two-front war into two one-front wars which it could hope to win. But for the plan to succeed, Germany would have to attack France in such a way as to avoid the heavy fortifications along the Franco-German border.
The logistics of the plan and its significance for the German war effort
Instead of a ‘head-on’ engagement, which would lead to position warfare of inestimable length, the opponent should be enveloped and its armies attacked on the flanks and rear.
Moving through Switzerland’s mountainous terrain would have been impractical, whereas in the North, Luxembourg had no army at all, and the weak Belgian army was expected to retreat to its fortifications.
Schlieffen decided to concentrate all German effort on the right wing of the German army, even if the French decided on offensive action along another part of the long common border and even at the risk of allowing the French temporarily to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine.
In his planning, Schlieffen counted on two things: that German victory in the West would be quick (he estimated this to take about 6 weeks), and that Russian mobilisation would be slow, so that a small German defensive force would suffice to hold back Russia (considered to be a ‘clay-footed colossus’) until France was beaten.
After a swift victory in the West, the full force of the German army would be directed eastwards. Russia would be beaten in turn. This was the recipe for victory, the certain way out of Germany’s encirclement.
The plan was first put to paper at the end of 1905 when Schlieffen retired, and was adapted to changing international circumstances by his successor, the younger Helmuth von Moltke.
The underlying principle remained the same until August 1914. By the autumn of 1913, all alternative plans had been abandoned, so that Germany would have to begin a European war, whatever its cause, by marching into the territories of its neutral neighbours in the West.
Shortcomings of the plan: Why didn't the Schlieffen Plan work?
There were a number of shortcomings associated with the plan. It imposed severe restrictions on the possibility of finding a diplomatic solution to the July Crisis, because of its narrow time-frame for the initial deployment of troops.
The escalation of the crisis to full-scale war was in no small measure due to Germany’s war plans. But more importantly, it unleashed the war with Germany’s invasion of neutral countries to the West.
The violation of Belgian neutrality in particular proved to Germany’s enemies that they were fighting an aggressive and ruthless enemy. It provided the perfect propaganda vehicle for rallying the country behind an unprecedented war effort and sustained the will to fight for four long years of war.
And it provided ample proof, if proof were needed, for the victors to allocate responsibility for the outbreak of the war to Germany and its allies.
Next: The August experience allegedly united people behind the 1914 war effort. But this shared enthusiasm is a myth. Read more in War enthusiasm
This page is part of our collection about the origins of the First World War.
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Germany was undergoing a process of unification at that time, a similar situation to some other places, and wars were common.
Approaching WW1, Germany was aware of the possibility of repeated atack by France along that southern route.
Terry Boardman - 5 February 2014 6:04pm
Dr Mombauer says the war enthusiasm is a myth; another MYTH is her own representation of the so-called "Schlieffen Plan", as in her article above she has simply repeated the conventional understanding of this so-called "Plan" (actually an ex post facto myth) without even referring to the ground-breaking work of Terence Zuber since 1999. She apparently does not want the general public (in her above article) to know of Zuber's work because it removes a major plank from her prejudicial view that Germany (and notably the German Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, the subject of one of her books) was solely responsible for the war.
See Zuber's latest book "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" (2011) for the demolition of the conventional view of the "Schlieffen Plan" that is represented by Mombauer, Herwig, Keegan et al.
The "Schlieffen Plan" is in any case a complete red herring, as the British warmongers in the Cabinet (the Liberal Imperialist trio (Asquith, Grey and Haldane) + Churchill and their 'silent ally' Lloyd George were determined that Britain should intervene for the sake of *France*, not Belgium. The Note from the Tory leaders urging intervention which was passed to Asquith during the critical Cabinet meeting of 2nd August did not even mention Belgium. If the Germans had not gone through Belgium and the Low Countries had not been involved at all, the Liberal and Tory leaders would STILL have sought to involve Britain in the war - because the French and Russian leaders had decided that THIS crisis had created the opportunity for the war they had so long desired. Grey's peace conference talks proposal was a unrealistic sham (it did not involve the principals) which he must have known was a non-starter and he kept the developing crisis from the Cabinet until 24th August, only *11 days* before Britain's declaration of war on Germany on 4th August! He then bounced the Cabinet into intervention (they agreed to commit the Royal Navy to defend France at the critical Cabinet of 2nd August) by bullying them with threats of his resignation, something he had done several times throughout his time as Foreign Secretary. It would have brought the government down. None of this was predicated on Belgium but only on "defending" France, i.e. the Entente. French troops in any case actually invaded German territory (in Alsace-Lorraine) *before* the German armies in Belgium were anywhere near the French border. The Russians had also invaded German territory (East Prussia) on 14th August before Germany had moved against Russia. The first German attacks against Entente territory came *only after* German territory in Alsace-Lorraine and East Prussia had been invaded by the French and Russians. The Russians had started the process by mobilising first, beginning secretly on 24th July - and all generals at that time knew that in this new industrial age, *mobilisation meant WAR*. Declarations of war belonged to the previous pre-industrial age. Mobilisation was the key to war 1914, not declarations of war. A sign of French aggression and their preparedness for it was that the Germans were only halfway through Belgium on 20th August, while the French had attacked into Alsace on 7th August already and into Lorraine on 14th August. This would have been the case even if Belgium had not been involved. The "Schlieffen Plan" is irrelevant and in any case, as Zuber has convincingly shown, it did not even exist in August 1914 in the form Mombauer asserts, or rather, repeats.
Terry Boardman - 6 February 2014 4:25pm
"... he kept the developing crisis from the Cabinet until 24th August..." was a typo. It should of course have read "... he kept the developing crisis from the Cabinet until 24th July..." i.e. he kept them in the dark about the developing crisis until 24th July.
Winston Churchill in "The World in Crisis" tells us that Grey had to keep everyone guessing (even the French) until German Army was were actually in Belgium because he [Grey] knew that only that fact would move the Cabinet - the majority of whom were against intervention for the sake of France - towards supporting intervention. Grey was a keen angler and knew how to play a (deceptive) waiting game in order to land his fish. Aware of the invasions of Luxemburg and Belgium, and intimidated by Grey's theats to resign, which would bring down the government (Asquith, Haldane and Churchill would have gone with him), the Cabinet desperately clutched at the pretext of the invasion of Belgium in order to go along with Grey and thus remain in government.
Harry Hudnall - 11 February 2014 1:29pm
There must be some sympathy for the Zy113756’s (henceforth Zy) criticism of Dr. Mombauer’s comments regarding aspects of her article “The Schlieffen Plan”.
The “Schlieffen Plan”, actually a study, written in January 1906, but back-dated to December 1905, that called for 24 divisions over and above those which the German army had available at the time, in order to invade France. There are grounds for regarding this “plan” as an admonishment to the Imperial Government: the army needed additional resources, money, men and equipment, far in excess of what parliament was then prepared to authorise, if a successful war against the Entente Powers were to be waged. It was not a detailed order of battle that could have been used to set troops on their way to France. Therefore Zy appears to be correct in that the “Schlieffen Plan” seems to be an irrelevance, a “red herring”, as regards the origins of the war. What Zy fails to mention is that Dr. Zuber discloses in his book "Inventing The Schlieffen Plan - German War Planning 1871-1914" (2002), that this “ex post facto myth” started when some German officers and writers in 1920 revealed the existence of the “plan” to the general public for the first time, simply to blame other German officers for the failure of Germany to win the war; the “Schlieffen Plan” was perfect the former claimed, it was just its execution by the latter that resulted in disaster! Scapegoating had begun and since then a motely group of e.g. radical pacifists, German patriots, passionate teutophiles and misguided PC historians have continued their efforts to put the blame on other people or other countries, for the WWI disaster? It is now fashionable, not only here in Germany, to put the blame equally on all participants in the crisis: a grotesque distortion of the historical facts.
Dr. Zuber writes in his book "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" (2011) that “The decision to go to war is political.” It is, therefore, to the political dimension of the July Crisis that we should turn our attention, if we want to understand how those clever politicos in 1914 got themselves into such a pickle?
It is a pity that Zy chose to occasionally adopt possibly inappropriate language and make unexplained assertions, as with: “her prejudicial view” and references to “British warmongers”, not to mention the allegation that “Tory leaders would STILL have sought to involve Britain in the war”. Does Zy seek to imply, in making the latter allegation, that Britain would definitely entered the war if Germany had not illegally invaded neutral Belgium?
Zy states that Grey’s proposed peace conference was “a unrealistic sham” and “a non-starter”, apparently because it “did not involve the principals”. This assertion seems not to be much of a starter itself, for if Britain, Italy, France and Germany of course, had agreed to impose a peaceful solution to the dispute between miniscule Serbia and militarily relatively weak Austro-Hungary, then war, certainly a world war, could have been avoided and many millions of lives saved? And is it pure coincidence that the Imperial German Government used this very excuse (i.e. it did not involve the principals), for refusing to participate in a conference to avoid war? Neither the German Government at the time nor Zy gave credible reasons why not inviting representatives of Serbia and Austro-Hungary to the proposed meeting, made such a conference impossible. As late as 28th July, Grey asked Germany to propose the form of mediation desired by Austria and Germany, to avoid war. That very evening, after receiving Grey’s proposal via Germany, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Berchtold rejected Grey’s suggested mediation as “too late”! Who would disagree that talking is better than slaughter?
A question that inescapably arises from any serious study of the German Government’s manoeuvrings during the July Crisis: did the German – or the Austro-Hungarian - decision makers really want to avoid war, particularly in the critical period before 28th July, the day when the dangers of the situation finally dawned on Berlin and the Kaiser began to get cold feet – but apparently far too late to change the process he had set in motion with his carte blanche some 3 weeks earlier?
In a supplementary mail Zy returns to the activities of Grey in the critical period, again using the former’s by now familiar language: he was “(deceptive)” and the British “Cabinet desperately clutched at the pretext of the invasion of Belgium”. As regards the latter observation, Zy once again seems to adopt the view of at least one of the Imperial German Government’s representatives in 1914: Britain going to war on a “pretext”, for a scrap of paper. The scrap in question being the Treaty of London (1839) that called upon signatory Germany as well as Great Britain among others to guard the neutrality of Belgium. This matter and Zy’s earlier observation that “Declarations of war belonged to the previous pre-industrial age.”, illustrate a catastrophic disregard for international law that perhaps typified German military-political thinking then and later and contributed in no small part to the disasters that befell that country and the world in the first half of 20th century.
Noticeably missing from Zy’s comments are details of the peace preserving endeavours of the Imperial German Government especially during the period before Austria-Hungary delivered its ultimatum to Serbia. Is this because they are insignificant or do not exist?
If the German Kaiser and his Chancellor had not given the Austrian government what has become known as the carte blanche on 5th and 6th July, would Emperor Franz-Joseph have been in a position to proceed with a war against Serbia, with the almost certainty that Russia would come to the assistance of its Slav brothers? To put it another way, could Austria-Hungary alone have stood any chance of prevailing in a conflict with Serbia and Russia? Had the carte blanche not been given, would this have changed the approach of Franz-Joseph and his advisors to the predicament viz. more emphasis on achieving a face-saving diplomatic resolution and much less on a military solution to the crisis? No carte blanche, no WWI thus? And no WWI no WWII?
Terry Boardman - 12 February 2014 1:38am
Zy115103 misses the point when s/he mentions that German officers in effect created the Schlieffen Plan myth in the 1920s by seeking "to blame other German officers for the failure of Germany to win the war". Yes indeed, they did engage in such scapegoating, particularly of Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of the General Staff for most of 1914, but that does not excuse Anglo-American historians, some German historians and Anglo-German historians such as Prof. Mombauer, John Roehl et al (let alone the likes of Jeremy Paxman, Michael Portillo, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson) merely repeating the myth about the Schlieffen Plan and claiming or implying that because Germany had had an "aggressive" war plan for years it must somehow have been guilty of planning to wage war. This is nonsense because planning how to wage i.e. conduct wars is what military staff officers do; it's their job. They have to prepare to fight wars aginst imagined or putative enemies of their country. The Americans and Japanese wargamed against each other for decades before actually fighting in 1941. Does anyone think the US and Chinese military have not already drawn up detailed plans for war against each other? Indeed Robert Kaplan already told us how America would fight China in Atlantic Monthly in June 2005. Obama appointed him to his defence team in 2009. Do people suppose the French, the Russians and the British did not have aggressive war plans to attack Germany and invade Germany in 1914? But we hear so little about those plans because the teutophobes have concentrated so exclusively on the mythical Schlieffen Plan to which now even *** Hastings ("Catastrophe", 2013)devotes only a desultory sentence or two in his large new tome and admits that "[no] precisely ordered ‘Schlieffen plan’ ever existed, and it seems
more appropriate to speak of an indisputable ‘Schlieffen concept’..." (p.299). "It seems...." writes Hastings, but as he hardly writes any more words about the Plan or "indisputable...concept" he leaves us none the wiser as to WHAT it actually was. He couldn't say any more because he and other Schlieffen Plan fans had been effectively outflanked already by Terence Zuber's articles and books which detail what the Plan was and wasn't - and Zuber's arguments do NOT support those many Anglo-American historians who have sought to argue that "the Schlieffen Plan" somehow proved that Germany had long been planning to conquer Europe; such nonsense was recently repeated in Jeremy Paxman's series "Britain's Great War" (academic consultant Annika Mombauer).
There WAS no 'single Schlieffen Plan of campaign drawn up by Schlieffen in 1905 that essentially remained in place until 1914 but was fatally tinkered with and weakened by von Moltke' as has been claimed so often. After the war the defeated German staff officers such as Ludendorff sought to scapegoat a man who couldn't answer back (von Moltke had died in 1916) and Mombauer and some other Anglo-Americans have gone on doing that until today e.g. *** Hastings described von Moltke as (op cit.): "...the man who had done more than any other to bring war about." This extreme assertion likely reflects the influence of Mombauer's shoddy and extremely prejudiced book "Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War" (2001).
It is not "a grotesque distortion of the historical facts", as Zy115103 asserts it is, "to put the blame equally on all participants in the crisis", because all the participants - from Serbia to Britain - WERE in the end prepared to risk some kind of war, minor or major, and were not prepared to do enough to avert it.
But there WERE those who had planned on a major European war, hoped for it and looked forward to it for many years, and they were in Paris, St Petersburg, London and ....the Vatican. Austria-Hungary wanted a war against Serbia to punish its act of State-sponsored terrorism and to reduce the very real Serbian threat to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Germany was prepared to support THAT war. French, Russian and some British leaders on the other hand, wanted a major European war *against Germany* and secondarily, against Austria-Hungary (which, with Turkey, was Russia's other target; see Sean McMeekin's book "The Russian Origins of the First World War"(2011))
Zy115103 claims that I used "possibly inappropriate language" and made "unexplained assertions", referring to Mombauer's "prejudicial view” and to “British warmongers”. Any unprejudiced person reading Mombauer's book on von Moltke would quickly realise that she has it in for him from the outset and that her book shows no understanding of the man; she treats him only as a cardboard caricature. Readers of this are encouraged to read the book themselves and make their own judgment.
As for British warmongers, they were legion. For those in the media of the day, consult the superb study by A.J.A.Morris "The Scaremongers - The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896-1914" (1984). No-one who reads even this one book could possibly agree with Hastings' claim that von Moltke was "...the man who had done more than any other to bring war about." The British diplomatic service and the Foreign Office were stuffed with teutophobes ready to argue for war against Germany rather than risk a weakening of Britain's fatal Ententes with revanchist France and glory-hunting Russia. These men included: FO: Eyre Crowe, Charles Hardinge, Arthur Nicolson, Louis Mallet, William Tyrrell (Tyrrell until 1912) and Edward Grey himself who was ACTUALLY the man who did "more than any other to bring [*WORLD*] war about" in 1914, as was recognised by insightful men such as Bernard Russell and H.G.Wells (as early as 1902), E.D. Morel, George Bernard Shaw, Lord Loreburn, Lord Morley (see his "Memorandum on Resignation"),and C.H.Norman. Warmongers in the diplomatic service included Francis Bertie, George Buchanan, and Cecil Spring-Rice. Ardent warmongers in the military included Admiral Jacky Fisher, Earl Roberts and General Henry Wilson to name but three, and they were at the very top. Then there was Col. Repington, military corrspondent of The Times, who in Dec.1905 - Jan.06. set up the secret military talks with the French and the (supposedly neutral!) Belgians. In government the warmongers (i.e. those who pursued policies that led inexorably to war and were prepared to risk that) included Grey, Asquith, Haldane (i.e. the Relugas Compact troika of Liberal Imperialists and former acolytes of Lord Rosebery), Churchill of course, from 1911, and clandestinely, (since 1911) Lloyd George. Outside government the leading warmongers (and foremost imperialists) were Arthur Balfour and Alfred Milner.
Zy115103 goes on to question my "allegation" that “Tory leaders would STILL have sought to involve Britain in the war” and asks if I seek to imply, in making this "allegation", "that Britain would definitely entered [sic] the war if Germany had not illegally invaded neutral Belgium?"
The answer to that is definitely: YES. Belgium was nothing but a hollow pretext. The British leaders actually cared not a jot for Belgium. It merely made things a bit easier for them in enabling them to trot out the usual "St. George rides to the rescue of the fair but helpless princess from the evil dragon" trope - invariably a figleaf hiding a multitude of sins, as we saw in 2001, 2003 and 2011. It was attempted again last summer over Syria. In 1914 it got the Cabinet off its hook on 2nd August before which (only 2 days before Britain's declaration of war!), most Cabinet members had not even seriously thought about or seriously discussed Belgium. It was Grey's bullying threat of resignation if the Cabinet refused to support FRANCE that concentrated their minds that day, because his troika pals would also have resigned and so would Churchill. The government would thus have disintegrated and the Cabinet Ministers would have fallen into obloquy. Grey threw down his gauntlet just at the 'right' moment of maximum tension (he was an excellent angler, remember)and NOT on account of Belgium at all but on account of France! The note passed to the Cabinet by the Tory leaders during that critical Cabinet meeting of 2nd August did not even mention intervention for the sake of Belgium but only for France because of Grey's duplicitous agreements to support France, which, if you recall, he HID from his own Cabinet colleagues (except his troika pals Asquith and Haldane)for FIVE YEARS 1906-11!
Zy115103 goes on: "...if Britain, Italy, France and Germany of course, had agreed to impose a peaceful solution to the dispute between miniscule Serbia and militarily relatively weak Austro-Hungary, then war, certainly a world war, could have been avoided and many millions of lives saved?"
This is, frankly, naive. France would not have "agreed to impose a peaceful solution to the dispute between Serbia and Austria-Hungary" because France, Russia and Britain had decided amongst themselves that THIS was the crisis that the Entente had decided would serve to bring about the war they wanted and had been planning for. Eyre Crowe argued in his memo to Grey on 25 July that France and Russia had decided "that the Austrian charges against Serbia are the pretexts and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged" (Sibyl Crowe, "Our Ablest Public Servant", p.259) Crowe ignored the justice of Austria's case against Serbia and pressed on Grey - who hardly needed pressing - repreatedly in the following days that it was now a matter of the 'Alliances' and that Britain must commit. As for Italy, she had already decided not to join her Triple Alliance partners anyway; her leaders knew what was coming. In any such mediation conference such as that proposed by Grey Italy would have sided with Britain and France against Germany.
Zy115103:"As late as 28th July, Grey asked Germany to propose the form of mediation desired by Austria and Germany, to avoid war. That very evening, after receiving Grey’s proposal via Germany, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Berchtold rejected Grey’s suggested mediation as “too late”! Who would disagree that talking is better than slaughter?"
To this I can only say that many people would disagree that talking is better than slaughter - IF they want to have a war, and Austria-Hungary and Germany (the latter until 30 July) DID want to have a *localised* punitive war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, I don't dispute that, but they didn't actively WANT a 'world war'. You cannot criticise them uniquely for wanting a localised war. In 1898, only 16 years earlier, the USA had made war on Spain; Britain had made war on the Boers 1899-1902; Britain had invaded Tibet in 1904, and Russia and Japan had fought a major conflict in 1904-05. There had been two Balkan Wars 1912-13. Such smaller scale wars (than general European or world war) were an instrument of policy in those days (they still are: 1991, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2011)
Zy115103: "...28th July, the day when the dangers of the situation finally dawned on Berlin and the Kaiser began to get cold feet – but apparently far too late to change the process he had set in motion with his carte blanche some 3 weeks earlier?"
No. The process was set in motion by the Austrians. After the Austrian *peacemaker* had been violently removed at Sarajevo (and please note all the major peacemakers on the Entente side were removed also: Rasputin badly wounded 12 July 1914, Joseph Caillaux was politically ruined in the Madame Caillaux trial July 1914, Jaures was assassinated 31 July 1914) the Austrian hawks who Franz Ferdinand had opposed for years were able to get their way. The Austrians sent Count Hoyos to Berlin to gain German support. Franz Ferdinand had been a personal friend of the Kaiser's. If the Prince of Wales and his wife were assassinated in Pakistan and Britain asked for a promise of US military support for some kind of British action against Pakistan (along the lines of the alleged 'Obama-killed-Osama' raid in 2011 or heavier) do you think the USA would refuse? Did the USA refuse to help Britain in the Falklands War in 1982? No. The Kaiser's *friends* had been killed and he was an emotional man.
Zy115103: "The scrap in question being the Treaty of London (1839) that called upon signatory Germany as well as Great Britain among others to guard the neutrality of Belgium."
No. "Germany" did not sign that Treaty; it weas signed by *Prussia*. The Treaty was a collective not an individual obligation.
Here is the text of the Treaty of 1839: http://www.scottmanning.com/content/treaty-of-london-1839/
Perhaps Zy115103 could point out the article that *specifies* that Britain was obliged to *guard* (i.e. with military force) the neutrality of Belgium. S/he will not find it. In the House of Commons and the House of Lords in 1867 the guarantee was recognised as collective not individual. Lord Salisbury in 1887 did not interpret the Treaty to mean that Britain had any such obligation and suggested that Britain would respond according to the circumstances. Sir Charles Hardinge, FO Permanent Under-Secretary under Grey, did the same. The members of the Cabinet on 1st August 1914 were not disposed to commit Britain to guarding Belgium. It was Grey's threat of resignation the following day that pushed them into compromising with him on intervention.
Zy115103's points about Germany breaking international law have little force becauee modern history is full of examples of countries breaking international law when it suits them - UK & US in 2003 for example. But in 2003 those 2 countries' national survival was not at stake. The Germans felt in 1914 that if they did not act quickly, they would be overwhelmed by the French and Russians and extinguished. Such was the depth of French 'revanchisme' that if they and Russia alone (without Britain) had defeated Germany, France would likely have taken the Rhineland as well as Alsace-Lorraine (as they were minded to do in 1923) and probably would have separated the southern German states, Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg from the rest of Germany. The Germans were thus appealing to the ulterior principle of self-preservation. There are a number of cases in history where Britain did not hesitate to act ruthlessly when it felt its crucial interests were at stake: attacking Denmark in 1807 for example. But even then Britainw as not facing direct invasion from two sides as Germany was in 1914. Indeed, Britain had not faced that in any serious way since 1066. The French and Russian armies actually crossed into German territory before the German army entered France.
Zy115103 says that "Noticeably missing" from my comments "are details of the peace preserving endeavours of the Imperial German Government especially during the period before Austria-Hungary delivered its ultimatum to Serbia. Is this because they are insignificant or do not exist?"
As I've already said, Germany favoured punitive action against Serbia by Austria-Hungary in July 1914 - as did many in Europe - but wanted it to be done by Austria-Hungary quickly - a short sharp strike. The Austrians, however, were slow in their preparations. After Serbia responded as it did to Austria's ultimatum, Kaiser Wilhelm II said the Serbian reply, accepting all Austria's demands except one (which was actually not an unreasonable one in the circumstances), removed all reason for war. But the Austrians went ahead with war anyway because they had insisted the Serbs accept ALL the demands in the ultimatum.
Zy115103: "the German Kaiser and his Chancellor had not given the Austrian government what has become known as the carte blanche on 5th and 6th July, would Emperor Franz-Joseph have been in a position to proceed with a war against Serbia, with the almost certainty that Russia would come to the assistance of its Slav brothers?"
Here is the elephant in the room: not only did Russia NOT have any treaty with Serbia like the Ententes and Alliances, it was not even really interested in the Balkans except in using the South Slavs as an instrument to undermine Austria and Turkey and thus achieve its aims re. Constantinople and the Straits. Most historians do not really question WHY on earth France and Britain allowed themselves to be dragged into a colossal war for the sake of the Russians' supposed fellow feeling for its little Serbian 'brethren'. The reason was that both France and Britain - or rather, their Foreign Offices - were actually afraid of 'losing Russia' to Germany if they failed to placate her and bend to her wishes, which were, in the balance of forces in Europe at that time, simply irresponsible. France and Britain gave their own carte blanche to Russia and did NOTHING to warn their Ennte partner away from mobilisation, because they didn't want to. They wanted the showdown with Germany then because they thought they could win.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire was the wronged party, and some form of justice was due to it. The Serbs should have recognised the crime their officials had been involved in against Austria and should have complied fully with Austria's ultimatum, but their national egoism prevented them from seeing this. Austria had always fulfilled a valuable function in the European State system and under Franz Ferdinand as Emperor there was the possibility it could have morphed into something more federal and trilateral, but instead, Russia and Serbia were determined to destroy Austria for the sake of their own national egoism, and France and Britain were prepared to back with their own carte blanche Russia's support for what in effect had been an act of Serbian terrorism that was State-sponsored insofar as the Serbian military intelligence had been involved and Serbian Ministers knew of the plot.
So...no Anglo-French carte blanche would have meant no WWI and thus no WWII. But Britain and France had their own chauvinist national egoisms - all of which were rooted in the deep materialism that afflicted European culture at that time.
Harry Hudnall - 13 February 2014 12:48pm
Would love to get into the matters raised by Zy113756 in the latest posting, but first there is some unfinished business. More discerning readers of this piece will have noted that while Zy113756 says a lot, no answer is given to what many will regard as a key question. Is this because no credible reply can be found that shows Germany in a good light? Here is the unanswered question again:
If the German Kaiser and his Chancellor had not given the Austrian government what has become known as the carte blanche on 5th and 6th July, would Emperor Franz-Joseph have been in a position to proceed with a war against Serbia, with the almost certainty that Russia would come to the assistance of its Slav brothers? To put it another way, could Austria-Hungary alone have stood any chance of prevailing in a conflict with Serbia and Russia? Had the carte blanche not been given, would this have changed the approach of Franz-Joseph and his advisors to the predicament viz. more emphasis on achieving a face-saving diplomatic resolution and much less on a military solution to the crisis? No carte blanche, no WWI thus? And no WWI no WWII?
Terry Boardman - 17 February 2014 9:41pm
Zy115103 seems to simply accept that Russia was in the right to support Serbia; s/he simply accepts that Russia would inevitably intervene. S/he avoids the following point: The very public assassination of the future Emperor of Austria-Hungary and his wife, following on other Serb-inspired terrorist outrages in earlier years, meant that by the standards of the time, Serbia surely deserved punishment for this latest heinous crime. By 2 July the Austrians, after all, had learned that the Serbs had been involved in the assassination (i.e. Major Tankosic, subordinate to Col. Dmitrijevic ['Apis'] of the Serbia Military Intelligence - C.Ponting, "Thirteen Days", p67). Why then should Russia have 'automatically' objected to the punishment of a State whose employees were involved in the murder of a fellow monarchist State, especially when the Russians already knew that the Serbs had been involved? Russia's 'friend' (client) had been involved in murder, so Russia should step in to prevent its friend from being punished and Russia's other two 'friends' (France and Britain) should actually support Russia in her stance??? Absurd! But that is what happened. The Entente Powers in effect went to war to cover up for an act of terrorism that issued from one of their client states! (France also had significant financial interests in that client state, Serbia) Russia had no moral right to object to the punishment of Serbia, but Britain and France did not attempt to restrain Russia in the slightest - because they had decided the time had come for the long-desired European war. If Russia had allowed Austria to punish Serbia (Nb the powerful Hungarian Minister Tisza had declared himself against any substantial reduction of Serbia), in the knowledge that any move by her against Austria would bring in Germany, there would have been no European war but only the punishment of Serbia.
But Britain and France gave carte blanche to Russia to intervene. THAT was the REAL carte blanche - the one that would lead to a *European* war and a *world* war. Russia's mobilisation - driven by Sazonov, Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevich, pushed Europe over the edge. At that time all serious military men in Europe would have agreed with the judgment made as long ago as 1892, by the Russian General Obruchev and his French counterpart General Boisdeffre, a judgment that was even more true in 1914: "The undertaking of mobilisation can no longer be considered as a peaceful act; on the contrary, it represents the most decisive act of war...Once we have been drawn into a war, we cannot conduct that war otherwise than with all our forces and against both our neighbours" - Russian General Obruchev (who drew up the military arrangements of the Franco-Russian Alliance with the French General Boisdeffre) to For. Min. Giers 7.5.1892 (in G.F.Kennan, "The Fateful Alliance", p.264); Boisdeffre: "to mobilise is to declare war. **To mobilise is to force your neighbour to do the same**..." (Kennan p.182) (my emphasis)
Serbia gave the order for mobilisation shortly after 6 pm, 25 July, soon after handing over its reply to the Austrian ultimatum. Russia gave the order for partial mobilisation on 29th July and for general mobilisation at 5 pm on 30 July. France ordered mobilisation at 4 pm 1 August. Germany did not order mobilisation until 5 pm 1 August.
Harry Hudnall - 20 February 2014 5:59pm
The previously sidestepped question remains unanswered. A second reply has been offered by Zy113756 that, like the first, does not directly address the query. Has Zy113756 considered a career in politics? Ok, time to move on and have a go at answering the question from this end.
Bottom line is that the only alternatives available to Austria-Hungary (AH) in July 1914, assuming Germany had declined to offer its eastern ally more or less unconditional support, were: to fight alone against Serbia and Russia or to go for a diplomatic solution. Let’s look at the latter first. The western powers and Germany and Russia would have probably supported AH demands for concessions from Serbia possibly along the lines of the AH ultimatum that was actually sent on 23rd July 1914, if AH had delicately implied early in the crisis that a failure by the other powers to pressure Serbia to give way could result in war. Serbia was considered a troublemaker and something of a pariah state in the west and Russia did not approve of assassinating members of Royal families. Nicolas II’s grandfather had been assassinated for political reasons. It therefore seems likely that under severe pressure a humiliated Serbia would have accepted an ultimatum and AH would have claimed that its honor had been satisfied?
Now what would have happened if AH had irrationally chosen to fight alone against Serbia and Russia: AH would almost certainly have been comprehensively defeated and as a possible template for the post-war settlement we have the Versailles Treaty. It is probable that Serbia and Russia would have attempted to annex large chunks of the former AH empire, but Germany and the western powers would have refuted excessive acquisitions, through diplomatic pressure. In this regard, Russia and Serbia would have been no match for Germany, France and Great Britain.
To sum up: if there had been no war Serbia would have been forced into painful concessions, but if Serbia had been attacked, the AH Empire would probably have ended up in the same place it actually was after WWI, but pariah Serbia and its ally Russia, as the war’s winners, would have ironically reaped the perhaps undeserved rewards of victory. However the war would have been limited to the three eastern European powers and consequently far fewer maimed soldiers, deaths, not to mention immeasurably lower cost in terms of money and property etc. In both of the above alternatives Imperial Germany and Imperia Russia would probably have survived intact, therefore no Soviet Union, no Hitler and in all probability no world war or holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s, no communist takeover of central and eastern Europe and of course no cold war?
It goes without saying, that should either of the hypothetical alternatives in the foregoing have applied it would have had unforeseeable consequences, although it is difficult to imagine a worse outcome for the rest of the 20th century than that which actually occurred after the July Crisis of 1914?
As we have entered the realm of hypotheticals, repeated below is a clearly heartfelt section of Zy113756 12 Feb 2014 01:38:
“If the Prince of Wales and his wife were assassinated in Pakistan and Britain asked for a promise of US military support for some kind of British action against Pakistan (along the lines of the alleged 'Obama-killed-Osama' raid in 2011 or heavier) do you think the USA would refuse? Did the USA refuse to help Britain in the Falklands War in 1982? No. The Kaiser's *friends* had been killed and he was an emotional man.”
Firstly, the murder of any individual, noble or not, is an inexcusably heinous crime and the perpetrators in principle subject to sanction. Secondly and of critical importance is the form that the retribution takes; it must be limited and proportional, but that is quite obviously not what Austria-Hungary and Germany planned in 1914: in what universe is invading a country – and starting a war - an appropriate response, a primary option, for the murder of two persons, aristocratic or not? In Zy113756’s above hypothetical, Britain asks the USA for support. The USA would consider what was appropriate, but certainly it would not authorise the Brits to proceed with a full scale invasion of the nation that sponsored the murders of the PoW and DoC, because a few members of the country’s elite were implicated in the crime. To extend the hypothetical: it is utterly inconceivable that the USA would then go on violate the territory of a country (in 1914 Belgium) whose neutrality had been guaranteed by the USA itself!
It is true that the USA did reluctantly give limited logistical help to Britain during its 1982 Falklands “colonial war”, comprising, from memory: munitions, Sidewinders and satellite data. Certainly there were no US boots on those south Atlantic islands. It was Britain’s war and although the US and Great Britain were NATO partners and close allies, the Brits had to fight it alone. In 1914 Imperial Germany needlessly went to war for an ally and definitely did send in the jackboots?
Just to test Zy113756’s obvious overarching sense of justice, what about the following scenario:
South Korea suffers yet another assault (border shelling, bringing down a South Korean civilian aircraft, sinking a South Korean naval ship, kidnapping the South’s citizens etc.) from its northern neighbour and decides enough is enough. The cease-fire in effect since the end of the Korean War has been breached by the North on multiple occasions therefore the South decides to send troops across the cease-fire line for a “limited” invasion of North Korea. South Korea is aware that in any military conflict China and perhaps Russia would assist the North and therefore requests support from the USA for a “localised war”, “a short sharp strike”? Clearly South Korea is the injured party, but what should Uncle Sam do? Go for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis, or give South Korea unlimited support as the Kaiser did in early July 1914? The situation on the Korean peninsula in 2014 is clearly not the same as central Europe in 1914, but the point is does an ally give its injured partner a carte blanche for military action against an aggressive, murderous pariah state? Would Zy113756’s righteous sensitivities be outraged if the USA imposed a diplomatic solution on its much suffering ally South Korea, in order to avoid a shooting war? A course of action that Imperial German calamitously failed to do, in a somewhat analogous situation in 1914?
Zy113756 writes in 17 Feb 2014 21:41:
“Zy115103 seems to simply accept that Russia was in the right to support Serbia; s/he simply accepts that Russia would inevitably intervene.” And goes on: “Why then should Russia have 'automatically' objected to the punishment of a State whose employees were involved in the murder of a fellow monarchist State, especially when the Russians already knew that the Serbs had been involved? Russia's 'friend' (client) had been involved in murder, so Russia should step in to prevent its friend from being punished and Russia's other two 'friends' (France and Britain) should actually support Russia in her stance??? Absurd! But that is what happened.”
Russian intervention was a given, whether one liked it or not. It was not a moral issue, a question of Russia being “in the right”; it was a matter of realpolitik. Only the foolishly naïve ignore a given. Austria-Hungary accepted that Russia would intervene, otherwise what was the point of the Hoyos mission to Berlin? It was surely the function of officials in Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary to do the best they could with this reality. The artful use of diplomacy was called for, to forge a coalition with the west and then get an agreement to punish Serbia in a way that did not involve a potential European war. After all, it was the central powers that wanted action against Serbia, therefore it behoved them to take the initiative and deal with Serbia in a rational and mature manner. The ball was in their court and they failed catastrophically.
The second paragraph of Zy113756 17 Feb 2014 21:41 refers to France and Britain’s carte blanche to Russia. Does one understand that Zy113756 has unearthed papers contemporaneous with the 1914 July Crisis and prior to the Imperial German carte blanche of 5th and 6th of July, that prove an unlimited commitment to Russia, by duly authorised representatives of the two western powers, for any action that Russia considered appropriate against the central powers? When will see these highly important, presently unknown, documents published?
As to the matter of mobilisation that also comes up in this second paragraph and again in the final paragraph: Zy113756 has forcefully claimed that military preparations e.g. the Schlieffen Plan cannot be considered as a cause of WWI; a “red herring”. In Zy115103 11 Feb 2014 13:29 the undersigned pointed out that ‘Dr. Zuber writes in his book "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" (2011) that “The decision to go to war is political.”’ Mobilisations come AFTER a political decision i.e. the Austria-Hungarian and German decision to initiate a “limited war”, that due to these countries extraordinary and criminal negligence first went European, then Global? The central powers decided on war at the beginning of July 1914; did they have the right to cry foul, like naïve little children, when their potential enemies drew the appropriate conclusion and mobilised?
Will now set about addressing the points raised by Zy113756 in his (perhaps the “Mr Boardman” mentioned in Dr. Mombauer’s piece of 12 Feb 2014 15:29?) posting of 12 Feb 2014 01:38. Watch this space.
Terry Boardman - 24 February 2014 1:40am
While I can accept that counterfactuals and hypotheticals can in certain circumstances be of help in developing understanding in the study of history, when one's argument consists of *almost nothing but hypotheticals* as is the case with the argument of Zy115103 (hereafter 103) in his/her previous post, then there is very little reality in the argument to engage with.
One could, understandably, posit the hypothetical, for example, that if the British Cabinet had responded positively to the German offer of peace made in December 1916 (rather vague though it admittedly was) then peace could have been negotiated between the already exhausted combatants before the Russian Revolution broke out, and before the Americans came in. The result would have been, to use 103's words: "Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia would probably have survived intact, therefore no Soviet Union, no Hitler and in all probability no world war or holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s, no communist takeover of central and eastern Europe and of course no cold war". The new 'War Cabinet' in Britain (which had come to power in a very British coup d'etat that very month) chose, however, to reject peace at Christmastime and to go on with the war and the slaughter. But of course they did, because that 5-man British War Cabinet had no intention whatsoever of making peace until Germany and Austria-Hungary had been defeated unconditionally. THAT was the reality, no hypothetical, that was why the War Cabinet had come about, and against such realities, purely hypothetical arguments such as those employed by 103 show themselves to be insubstantial.
Before I deal with 103's points, let me make clear once again my own view: Once the peacemaker Franz Ferdinand had been removed by force (along with the removal of key peacemakers in the Entente countries, as I pointed out last time - all to clear the path for the warmongers in those countries) the hawkish faction in the Austro-Hungarian elite, now freed from Franz Ferdinand, who had held them back, moved to make war against Serbia. What they WANTED was a small war against Serbia, not simply because they wanted to beat up a small neightbour for no particular reason but because that small neighbour had been engaged in a number of terrorist actions against Austria-Hungary over the previous decade and because they knew - as did most other well-informed people in Europe - that the stated goal of Serbian chauvinists was to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire and they could expect that after Serbia's successes in the Balkan Wars, it would become even more aggressive towards the A-H Empire. The Austrians hoped that, as in 1908-09 at the time of the Bosnian Crisis, they would receive the support of their ally Germany in facing down any possible Russian moves and that, as on that earlier occasion, Russia would opt not to move to help Serbia. The German Kaiser, whose personal friend Franz Ferdinand had just been murdered by Bosnian Serbs, promptly gave the Austrians his support. This was the infamous blank cheque that 103 seems to believe determined the blaeful course of the 20th century. I don't question that in early July Germany gave Austria a 'blank cheque'. But the questions we should ask are: for what, for when and for how much? Germany did not intend to give AH a blank cheque for a major European war against all the Entente Powers, as is clear from the reactions of the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg later in the month, when they realised that the Entente Powers were set on war against them. Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted no more than a short sharp punitive war against Serbia that would not wipe Serbia off the map and incorporate it into the A-H Empire but would take it down several pegs and force it to become more pacific towards the A-H Empire; they did NOT want a major European war involving all the Entente Powers and it is disingenuous of people like *** Hastings to suggest that they did. The balance of evidence simply does not support this view. There had been several European crises since the 1880s, and none of them had resulted in a major war because one or more of the Powers had always backed off. It was understandable that those in charge in Vienna and Berlin thought this would happen again.
Russia and France, on the other hand, DID want a major European war against the two Central Powers because that was the only way their particular national goals could be achieved (France - retaking Alsace-Lorraine; Russia - taking all Slav territories from A-H Empire and establishing a Balkan League under its own leadership that would then be useful in gaining its ultimate prize - Constantinople and the Straits). 103 consistently refuses to acknowledge these well-attested FACTS. S/he only needs to look into the activities and statements of French individuals such as the President Poincare, Delcasse, Clemenceau, and others such as the very well-connected arch-chauvinist Juliette Adam, not to mention, in St Petersburg, the doings of the French ambassador Paleologue and the warmongering, pro-French Montenegrin princesses married to Russian Grand Dukes, in order to see that a war of revanche with Germany was ardently desired by these people. S/he only needs to read Sean McMeekin's recent book "The Russian Origins of the First World War" to see that the Russian government itself had been planning for the war since at least the beginning of 1914. But instead of this, s/he just sticks to his/her ONE line - the 'blank cheque' of 6 July 1914.
103 also needs to consider this statement from Sir Edward Grey, sent to the British ambassador in Paris on 31 July (Telegram 119): "The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilisation of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, **would precipitate a crisis**, and would make it appear that German mobilisation was being forced by Russia" - as indeed it did and was, because in those days anyone who knew about military matters understood that *mobilisation was itself the first act of war*, even if war had not been declared, something else that 103 chooses to ignore just as s/he chooses to ignore the order in which the countries actually mobilised in July/August 1914.
Now let's turn to 103's most recent points, or rather, box of hypothetical tissues. For s/he gets straight into that box, argung that: "The western powers and Germany and Russia would have probably supported AH demands for concessions from Serbia possibly along the lines of the AH ultimatum that was actually sent on 23rd July 1914, if AH had delicately implied early in the crisis that a failure by the other powers to pressure Serbia to give way could result in war." "....probably....possibly...."
103 is assuming that France and Russia were wanting to be reasonable and pacific and would have acted reasonably and pacifically. But they were not and did not. France did NOTHING to urge restraint on Russia, and Russia proceeded to mobilisation measures even before the Austrians had declared war on Serbia on 28 July. France and Russia had decided that this crisis was the casus belli, the pretext for the war they had long been looking forward to. The Russians knew they had the backing of the French, and the French felt confident that the British would come in to support them.
It's a nonsense to suggest, as 103 does, that because Nicholas II's grandfather (Aleander II) had been assassinated (in 1881) that this in itself would make him acquiesce in Serbia's punishment: "It therefore seems likely that under severe pressure a humiliated Serbia would have accepted an ultimatum and AH would have claimed that its honor had been satisfied?" ("it seems likely....would have.....would have....")
A lot of water had flown under the Russian bridge since 1881, and a lot of French money and investments as well.... 103 might like to look into that - when it began, who provided it, what was done with it (in terms of armaments and railways) and how the French also sought to currry favour by providing Nicholas' hemophiliac young son with healers and advisers from occult circles (le Maitre Philippe and Papus), men who were in effect blocked by Rasputin, who was later one of those opposed to war (despite his otherwise unsalutary reputation) which is why the warmongers in Russia around Grand Duke Nicholas tried to have him murdered in July 1914.
103 then goes for his/her next hypothetical paper tissue: "Now what would have happened if AH had irrationally chosen to fight alone against Serbia and Russia: AH would almost certainly have been comprehensively defeated and as a possible template for the post-war settlement we have the Versailles Treaty. It is probable that Serbia and Russia would have attempted to annex large chunks of the former AH empire, but Germany and the western powers would have refuted excessive acquisitions, through diplomatic pressure. In this regard, Russia and Serbia would have been no match for Germany, France and Great Britain." (I count 5 'would haves' there) but this is all utterly divorced from reality because in 1914 there was no way France and Britain were going to line up alongside Germany to force their will on Russia and Serbia. Only someone utterly ignorant of the minds and views of the principal figures in the British Foreign Office since the 1890s and especially since Sir Edward Grey arrived as Foreign Secretary and Sir Charles Hardinge as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1906, could imagine that they were! For these men, supporting France and Russia against Germany was a cardinal principle of their policy.
103's summing up consists of 6 long sentences of nothing but hypotheticals and imaginations - all of which are rendered completely redundant by the absurdity of 103's inital premise: "Now what would have happened if AH had irrationally chosen to fight alone against Serbia and Russia?" THAT was simply NEVER going to happen. The leaders in Austria-Hungary were not going to take on Russia without German help. Even academic supporters of the 'blame Germany' position, such as Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig ("Decisions for War 1914-1917") recognise that.
103's tissue of hypotheticals rests on an initial and even irrational assumption that s/he then claims "would have" led to the survival of Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia, the absence of the Soviet Union, "no Hitler, no [second] world war or holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s, no communist takeover of central and eastern Europe and of course no cold war". Instead of examining all of the evidence that argues for a design by certain elements in the Entente Powers - stretching back to the 1880s - to bring about a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary (*as only through such a European war could the prime strategic goals of elites in France, Russia, Britain and Italy be realised*), 103 prefers to press a single abstract tissue of supposedly logical hypothetical statements utterly divorced from reality.
I'll turn to the second part of 103's post in a separate reply.
Harry Hudnall - 1 March 2014 4:34pm
Excellent, now we are starting to get somewhere!
In Zy113756 24 Feb 2014 01:40/Mr B? admits that:
“I don't question that in early July Germany gave Austria a 'blank cheque'.”
And later goes on in the same posting to confirm effectively that Austria-Hungary would not have fought a war at that time against Russia, without Germany’s “Carte Blanche”:
"THAT was simply NEVER going to happen. The leaders in Austria-Hungary were not going to take on Russia without German help. Even academic supporters of the 'blame Germany' position, such as Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig ("Decisions for War 1914-1917") recognise that.”’
Zy113756/Mr B?, therefore concedes, that no German “Blank Cheque”, would have meant no Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia, because the risk of Russian intervention was far too great. Clearly Austria-Hungary believed Russia would intervene, otherwise why was a German guarantee of support necessary and obviously Austria-Hungary did not really believe the hope, in the 1914 situation, offered by Zy113756/Mr B?, that:
“Russia would opt not to move to help Serbia”.
No one should be astonished therefore, that the undersigned, as Zy113756 24 Feb 2014 01:40 /Mr B? puts it:
“seems to believe [that the Blank Cheque] determined the blaeful [sic] course of the 20th century”.
The immediate causes of WWI are thus clarified: it was largely due to the “Blank Cheque” that Wilhelm II and Bethmann-Hollweg gave Franz-Josef I and, as clearly the initiative for effective diplomatic action rested with the aggressors, the subsequent German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic incompetence in not obviating the obviously impending war.
Now that we are agreed on the immediate causes of WWI, there are a few outstanding matters that Zy113756/Mr B? will want addressed:
Zy113756/Mr B? explains what Austria-Hungary and Germany hoped for, or what they intended, almost as if these are exculpatory: i.e. apparently it does not matter what actually happened, it is only the hopes and intentions that are relevant!
He also states rightly that Wilhelm II was “emotional”, a characteristic that he mentions more than once, as if this trait not only explains the Kaiser’s well known bizarre behaviour, but also excuses it? The perceptive observer must always be mindful of what actually happened and not merely the (alleged) hopes and intentions of the protagonists, even when one of them is “emotional”. Just as e.g. a bank robber - “emotional” or not - who “hopes” that everything will go smoothly and “intends” to avoid violence, cannot complain when he is brought to account after killing someone in pursuit of the robbery. Speaking pathetically later, about his non-violent “hopes” and “intentions” would not cut much ice with judge, jury and the victim’s loved ones (or, in Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s case regarding WWI, with mature historians?).
Zy113756/Mr B? states that Austria-Hungary and Germany wanted, intended, hoped for a limited, localised war, but can point to no realistic strategy or road map by which they planned to achieve this goal. Where is the diplomatic effort on or immediately after the issuance of the “Blank Cheque” to bring the Entente Powers on side? The responsible persons in Austria-Hungary and Germany, as initiators of this limited-war strategy should surely have been relentlessly pro-active in trying to persuade all the European Powers of the righteousness of their intentions and get the level of agreement that would have enabled them to put their plans into effect, without starting a World War? A question that Zy113756/Mr B? may want to wrestle with is, if a country and its supporting ally plan a localised war, but keep their thoughts and strategies secret and do nothing diplomatically to assuage the growing fears of their potential opponents - until the very end of the crisis when everything threatens to go pear-shaped and even then their reaction is incredibly half-hearted – whereupon a World War starts, did this country and its ally perform optimally?
Zy113756/Mr B? has claimed that Great Britain used the defence of Belgian neutrality as a “pretext”. (A view that the undersigned does not accept: the violation of Belgian neutrality was probably not the only reason for Britain’s intervention, but it was a legitimate casus belli, if unsurprisingly disputed by some). However Zy113756/Mr B? appears to avow that the war Austria-Hungary planned against Serbia and for which Germany gave its full support (N.B. not limited support) was truly based on a PRETEXT, namely the murders in Sarajevo. As far as Zy113756/Mr B?’s attempt to excuse Wilhelm’s “Blank Cheque” on the basis of his EMOTIONAL character, we should remember that the meeting on 5th July was fully a week after the murder of the monarch’s “friend”. In any case, the real reason the Austro-Hungarians and Germans wanted to fight was to teach Serbia a lesson, as Zy113756/Mr B? writes:
“the hawkish faction in the Austro-Hungarian elite… moved to make war against Serbia…” but “What they WANTED was a small war against Serbia…because that small neighbour had been engaged in a number of terrorist actions against Austria-Hungary over the previous decade…and…that small neighbour had been engaged in a number of terrorist actions against Austria-Hungary over the previous decade”.
Moreover, Zy113756/Mr B? maintains:
“Germany did not intend to give AH a blank cheque for a major European war against all the Entente Powers, as is clear from the reactions of the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg later in the month, when they realised that the Entente Powers were set on war against them.”
What these two gentlemen wanted or intend[ed] and were forced to conclude later in July 1914 raises a couple of issues. That aggressive warmongers would want a limited war is obviously a truism. What form of unlimited war could these two Triple Alliance belligerents hope to win? And what effective action did the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg take in late July to avert the impending hostilities “when they realised that the Entente Powers were set on war against them” as Zy113756/Mr B (prejudicially?) puts it? It should be recalled (see J.C.C.G. Rohl book quote below) that the spectre of a European war was recognised in German government circles long before the July Crisis got underway. The Germanic politico-military, somewhat tautological thinking ran along these lines: if the Russians did intervene then it was clear that they wanted war; furthermore, German officials thought: if there were going to be a war with Russia, 1914 was preferable to later, when the latter would be relatively stronger – a preventative war against Russia was thus not merely a totally acceptable risk, but desirable! Here is a smoking gun in the form of a report from Germany’s Foreign Minister, Von Jagow, in 1914:
Von Jagow’s notes on a chat with Field Marshal Von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, in May 1914:
"Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near future."
Röhl, John C G. 1914: Delusion or Design. Elek. pp. 29–32. ISBN 0-236-15466-4
When, after four weeks of severely misjudging the developing situation that was initiated by Kaiser and Chancellor’s very own “Blank Cheque”, they started to get cold feet (see related paragraph in my Zy115103 11 Feb 2014 13:29) and it dawns on them that they really were in the process of provoking a European war, what do they do to rectify the situation: hardly anything! It is instructive at this point to recall a situation in 1887: German warmongers called a War Council as they wanted a preventative invasion of France, before the French became even stronger: by 1887 the Gallic Nation had recovered appreciably from the depredations of the 1870/71 conflict. The then German Emperor Wilhelm I, Wilhelm II’s grandfather, reluctantly acceded to the aggressive preventative war. When Reich Chancellor Bismarck was informed of this criminal nonsense, he threatened to resign and the old Emperor, who died the following year, gladly called off the whole illegitimate scheme. Unfortunately in 1914, Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, did not have the strength of character, common sense actually, to follow the path taken in 1887. Incidentally, Prince Wilhelm, the later Emperor, was present at the 1887 War Council as an observer but not permitted to speak and obviously was aware of Wilhelm I’s subsequent climb-down. Therefore it cannot be claimed that as Emperor and Commander in Chief at the end of July 1914, he knew of no precedent to use to get himself out of the mess he was in and for which he had only himself to blame.
“The Entente powers”, Zy113756/Mr B? writes, were “set on war” in late July. Really? Certainly not Great Britain, as the British Cabinet voted overwhelmingly on the morning of 1st August not to intervene! Why had the relentless exertions of those allegedly all-powerful British and Entente warmongers who according to Zy113756/Mr B? were eager to send in the troops, resulted at that late date, in a Cabinet decision to stay neutral? Once again, it was further German provocations that changed the situation dramatically for the British Cabinet: the invasion of Belgium and the transit of large German warships through the newly completed Kiel Canal, not only threatened the French coast which Britain was committed to protect, but these naval dispositions imperilled the Island Nation’s trade e.g. vital agricultural imports etc. That Germany could have been so criminally stupid not only to invade Belgium but additionally send battleships from the Baltic to the North Sea at this critical phase in the crisis beggars belief. How was it possible that this navy-obsessed Kaiser and his chancellor did not realise that increasing the number battleships on the German North Sea coast opposite England and within easy striking distance of the French shoreline could only fatally exacerbate an already perilous situation, in August 1914.
Regarding Hypotheticals. In one’s own defence, it was not yours truly who lobbed the first hypothetical into the discussion: as with Austria-Hungary and Germany, Zy113756/Mr B? should also not be surprised if a provocation results in a reaction! Whilst on the subject of one’s hypotheticals and the related “probably…possibly…would…could”, that apparently so frustrated Zy113756/Mr B?: one cannot rationally use a definite form when dealing with conjecture, otherwise one is in danger of looking foolish e.g. in Zy113756/Mr B?’s 12 Feb 2014 01:38, one reads:
Zy115103 goes on to question my "allegation" that “Tory leaders would STILL have sought to involve Britain in the war” and asks if I seek to imply, in making this "allegation", "that Britain would definitely entered [sic] the war if Germany had not illegally invaded neutral Belgium?"
The answer to that is definitely: YES. Belgium was nothing but a hollow pretext.
Here Zy113756/Mr B? seemingly lays claim supranatural knowledge: How can anyone rationally claim that something “definitely” would have happened…when in reality it did not, when it is hypothetical? Had Zy113756/Mr B? time-machined back a hundred years and somehow stopped Germany invading Belgium, in order to confirm aggressive British reactions? Or perhaps a portal to a parallel universe or a Divine Vision, is the source of the “definite” occurrence that indubitably did not happen on this planet? The undersigned may have said: probably, or possibly, or would most likely have come to pass, but then I have no access to revelations from the beyond… Zy113756/Mr B? makes similarly sweeping non-conditional statements in other places, that are perhaps simpler to write and concise, but strictly speaking, academically insupportable?
Furthermore it is splendidly revealing that Zy113756/Mr B? insists that a further hypothetical, it goes without saying from his touchscreen, is understandable. The speculation he proffers concerns events in 1916 and this begs the question: how do possible feeble Teutonic peace feelers in 1916, naturally at a point when things were not going too well for Germany, shed light on the origins of WWI? The situation in the war’s second year was in no way analogous to pre-war conditions! Would it be superfluous to point out that fighting was taking place in 1916 only because Germany and Austria-Hungary caused the war in the first place and to quote Zy113756/Mr B?:
“THAT was the reality”.
One is looking forward to Zy113756/ Mr B?’s views on the South Korean hypothetical in my 20 Feb 2014 17:59, that is relevant and analogous to the position in which Austria-Hungary and Germany found themselves, in 1914?
Harking back to the unassailable conclusions offered at the start of this posting, here is a last word – or two. There were lots of reasons why numerous persons in various European countries, in the 45 years preceding July 1914, wanted to get into a war, one with the other. Zy113756/Mr B? has mentioned several of these at length. He refers to e.g.:
“all of the evidence that argues for a design by certain elements in the Entente Powers - stretching back to the 1880s - to bring about a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary”.
Those fiendish Entente elements! However, he does not mention the warmongering 1887 German War council, outlined in the foregoing, now why was that, the neutral observer asks? Also missing is an explanation as to why those myriads of influential Entente jingoists and others who passionately wanted a major war, wholly failed for decades to attain their nefarious objective? Hordes of historians have discovered and are still unearthing all sorts of fascinating facts that add to our (background) knowledge, in this regard. There were “warmongers”, revanchists, self-serving, corrupt, grubby, weak or strong politicians, passionate nationalists, sinister French occultists with odd names, mad monks, newspaper campaigns, arms-dealers and greedy businessmen, gung-ho militarists, the prejudiced and the incompetent and those too clever by half, not to mention misjudgements on every side, yes, indeed, yes! However, to determine the immediate origin of the war we must view this data critically and forensically, we must cut through the noise and clutter: what actions (not hopes, or intentions, or rhetoric) were the critical ones that led directly to war. What action(s) was essential in order for the war to have occurred at that point and without which there would not have been a war? WWI did not properly start until Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, an act that came to pass only after Germany had given its unlimited support for this aggressive action. (This German backing was obviously also an indispensable pre-condition for the various and related cascade of mobilisations, later on). Of course the killing of the couple in Sarajevo was a prerequisite, but utterly insufficient of itself, to cause a war and it is clear that those deaths in Bosnia were not the real motivation for Austria-Hungary to take up arms in 1914. Misguided individuals are forever executing stupid and dangerous plans that are often high profile but relatively small in scale; these actions almost never justify the invasion of a sovereign state. The Sarajevo assassinations certainly did not in themselves make war inevitable. Looking back, the “Blank Cheque” pretty well did: at the beginning of July 1914, the Austro-Hungarians wanted to slap down Serbia and needed German support against Russia, without which war with Serbia was infeasible. It was the wildly reckless, needlessly given German unconditional “Carte Blanche” for war against Serbia (ably assisted in the following four weeks by extraordinary incompetent German political and military shenanigans) that incontrovertibly started the countdown to war.
Terry Boardman - 11 March 2014 2:10pm
This is the reply to Case Closed. Facts v. Hopes, Wants and Intentions, posted by Zy115103 1 Mar 2014 16:34
The case is far from closed, as Zy115103 (hereinafter 103) will now realise:
103 writes "Clearly Austria-Hungary believed Russia would intervene, otherwise why was a German guarantee of support necessary and obviously Austria-Hungary did not really believe the hope, in the 1914 situation, ....that: “Russia would opt not to move to help Serbia”."
Now there is such a thing as an insurance policy. One does not KNOW that the coming storm will take off one's house roof but one has insurance JUST IN CASE IT DOES. Austria asked for Germany's backing *in case* the Russians would step in, not because they believed Russia "WOULD DEFINITELY intervene" or because they "did not really believe" that “Russia would opt not to move to help Serbia”. This is just assumption on 103's part. In 1908/09 over the Bosnian Crisis, the Russians had not moved. For all 103 knows, the Austrians may have hoped the Russians would not move in 1914, but they did not know for sure so they sought the
backing of the Germans just in case.
103: "The immediate causes of WWI are thus clarified: it was largely due to the “Blank Cheque” that Wilhelm II and Bethmann-
Hollweg gave Franz-Josef I and, as clearly the initiative for effective diplomatic action rested with the aggressors, the subsequent
German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic incompetence in not obviating the obviously impending war."
It is absurd that 103 goes on and on and on insisting that "the baleful course of the 20th century" was decided ONLY by the blank
cheque of 6 July, when in fact the July Crisis could have been terminated at other points en route before 1-4 August (and the war itself could have been terminated in Dec 1916), and as usual s/he denies that the Russians or the French or the British had any choice in the matter and HAD to behave like automatons once the 'blank cheque' had been issued. To repeat, Germany's blank cheque to Austria was for a limited local punitive war by Austria against Serbia. Russia, France and Britain ought to have recognised the justice of this action, given the circumstances both of the Sarajevo crime and of the numerous cases of Serbian-instigated terrorism against Austria over the previous decade (and in fact Sir Edward Grey at least DID recognise it in various statements - see the British Blue Book of diplomatic documents). But the Czar - pushed into it by the Russian warmongering clique of Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, Yanushkevich, Krivoshein and Grand Duke Nicholas - chose to escalate the situation into a pan-European general conflict between the two alliance blocs by ordering general mobilisation (i.e. WAR) on 30th July, despite the fact that Austria had assured all the Powers that she had no intention of annihilating or swallowing Serbia. ["Conrad also wanted to annex Belgrade and other areas; the emperor and Berchtold said this was impossible" (Janner, 'The Lions of July', p.230)]
And why did the Russians do this? Because by ths point they knew the French were behind them and were encouraging them and
they also had reason to feel the British were too, especially since Grey had agreed to the 'secret' Anglo-Russian Naval Convention in
June, something the Russians had been pressing upon the British since early in 1914, and because Churchill ordered the British Fleet to remain concentrated on 27 July which Grey did not countermand; this was in effect a signal to the Russians that the British were
readying themselves for action in support of France, Russia's ally. That British order for concentration of the Fleet (Britain's main weapon of war) was the day BEFORE Austria declared war on Serbia (28th), who had in any case ordered her own army mobilised hours BEFORE returning her reply to Austria's ultimatum.
103: "Now that we are agreed on the immediate causes of WWI...."
Clearly we are not agreed, as I do not accept that 103 has proved his/her case.
"Zy113756/Mr B? also states rightly that Wilhelm II was “emotional”, a characteristic that he mentions more than once, as if this trait
not only explains the Kaiser’s well known bizarre behaviour, but also excuses it?"
103's argument is getting desperate here. Please note the 'as if'. I was merely pointing out that the German Kaiser was an *emotional man* whose personal friend and his wife had just been brutally murdered. I mentioned this merely to draw attention to the fact that this relationship between the two men was a factor that shows that Franz Ferdinand was not just any archduke or aristocrat or even just any human being - as 103 had been implying. The killers killed THIS man for a particular reason because of who HE was and what HE was seeking to do for Austria which would have frustarated the plans for Bosnis harboured by Serbia and Russia.
103 says: "Zy113756/Mr B? states that Austria-Hungary and Germany wanted, intended, hoped for a limited, localised war, but can
point to no realistic strategy or road map by which they planned to achieve this goal. Where is the diplomatic effort on or immediately
after the issuance of the “Blank Cheque” to bring the Entente Powers on side? The responsible persons in Austria-Hungary and
Germany, as initiators of this limited-war strategy should surely have been relentlessly pro-active in trying to persuade all the
European Powers of the righteousness of their intentions and get the level of agreement that would have enabled them to put their
plans into effect, without starting a World War? A question that Zy113756/Mr B? may want to wrestle with is, if a country and its
supporting ally plan a localised war, but keep their thoughts and strategies secret and do nothing diplomatically to assuage the
growing fears of their potential opponents - until the very end of the crisis when everything threatens to go pear-shaped and even then
their reaction is incredibly half-hearted – whereupon a World War starts, did this country and its ally perform optimally?"
My reply:
a) For the nth time, Austria and Germany weren't seeking to start a World War; that's just 103's exaggeration and
b) in answer to 103's questions above, I invite him/her to read the Austrian Red Book which s/he evidently has not done, otherwise
s/he wouldn't have asked the question!
103: "Zy113756/Mr B? has claimed that Great Britain used the defence of Belgian neutrality as a “pretext”. (A view that the undersigned does not accept: the violation of Belgian neutrality was probably not the only reason for Britain’s intervention, but it was a legitimate casus belli, if unsurprisingly disputed by some)."
So 103 acknowledges that "the violation of Belgian neutrality was probably not the only reason for Britain's intervention..."? This progress perhaps! Well might s/he acknowledge this, as the issue was not seriously discussed by the Cabinet until 2nd August !!!
"However Zy113756/Mr B? appears to avow that the war Austria-Hungary planned against Serbia and for which Germany gave its
full support (N.B. not limited support) was truly based on a PRETEXT, namely the murders in Sarajevo."
No, this is a slippery argument. I have never said that I avow that the war Austria planned was simply based on a pretext (the murders in Sarajevo). A foul crime had, after all, been committed. The involvement of Serbia had been established. Punishment was in order. Some of the hawks in Vienna who had always wanted to attack Serbia may certainly have felt that now was their chance when the very man who had always blocked them - Franz Ferdinand himself - had just been removed, but that does not change the fact that a punitive action by Austria was *justified* in the circumstances.
103: "As far as Zy113756/Mr B?’s attempt to excuse Wilhelm’s “Blank Cheque” on the basis of his EMOTIONAL character,
Again, this is false and slippery. I have never attempted to *excuse* Wilhelm’s “Blank Cheque” on the basis of his EMOTIONAL
character. "excuse" is 103's word.
103: "Moreover, Zy113756/Mr B? maintains:
“Germany did not intend to give AH a blank cheque for a major European war against all the Entente Powers, as is clear from the
reactions of the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg later in the month, when they realised that the Entente Powers were set on
war against them.” What these two gentlemen wanted or intend[ed] and were forced to conclude later in July 1914 raises a couple of
issues. That aggressive warmongers would want a limited war is obviously a truism."
To repeat, what the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg wanted, given the circumstances, was only justice for Austria, their ally. 103 seems
set - just like the Russians, French and British in 1914 - on ignoring the crime that had been committed and the context of previous
Serbian outrages that had preceded it.
103: "What form of unlimited war could these two Triple Alliance belligerents hope to win?"
For example, the one the Kaiser (and even Sir Edward Grey at one point!) later suggested - that the Austrians should occupy
Belgrade for a while - until the Serbs agreed to accept the entirety of the ultimatum that had been presented to them.
"And what effective action did the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg take in late July to avert the impending hostilities “when
they realised that the Entente Powers were set on war against them” as Zy113756/Mr B (prejudicially?) puts it?
I refer 103 a) to read the diplomatic records (e.g. the German White Book, the Austrian Red Book) and
b) the Kaiser, as 103 will know, engaged in a number of personal telegrams (the Willy-Nicky exchanges) to the Czar
c) Bethmann-Hollweg told Austria to reaffirm its promise not to take Serbian territory and to reassure Russia "that [Austria's] military
measures contemplate solely a temporary occupation,in order to force from Serbia a guarantee of future good behaviour". (Janner,
p.211) Cf. Sazonov's ridiculous response to the German ambassador when informed of this: 'he could not abandon Serbia "without
endangering the life of the Czar"'!(Janner, p.212)
103: "It should be recalled (see J.C.C.G. Rohl book quote below) that the spectre of a European war was recognised in German
government circles long before the July Crisis got underway.
a) I note the teutophobic source 103 cites here - Roehl, the mentor of Annika Mombauer.
b) "the spectre of a European war was recognised .....long before the July Crisis got underway" by just about all government circles
of the European Powers, not just the Germans.
103: "The Germanic politico-military, somewhat tautological thinking ran along these lines: if the Russians did intervene then it was
clear that they wanted war; furthermore, German officials thought: if there were going to be a war with Russia, 1914 was preferable to
later, when the latter would be relatively stronger – a preventative war against Russia was thus not merely a totally acceptable risk, but
desirable!"
This kind of thinking was again not restricted to the German military. See McMeekin, "The Russian Origins of the First World War",
Clark, "The Sleepwalkers", Wilson, "The Policy of the Entente".
103: "Here is a smoking gun in the form of a report from Germany’s Foreign Minister, Von Jagow, in 1914:
Von Jagow’s notes on a chat with Field Marshal Von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, in May 1914:
"Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three
years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not
know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making
preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed
that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near future."
Röhl, John C G. 1914: Delusion or Design. Elek. pp. 29–32. ISBN 0-236-15466-4"
103 may think this is "a smoking gun", but it may really be nothing of the sort.
First: the key point is obviously the last two sentences above: BUT when did Jagow write them? After Moltke's death in June 1916 or
before? Can 103 prove that this WAS in fact written in May 1914? Or, if later, how does s/he know that it was not written later in his 1919 memoirs by a Jagow trying to deflect blame from himself for Germany's defeat? How does s/he know it was not a deliberate lie? A number of high-ranking staff sought to blame Miltke after the war fo the failure of the German army in 1914 when he was dead and could not answer back. Lying was widespread among leading figures on both sides before, during and after the July 1914 crisis and after the war when the memoirs were being written. We know that there was a great deal wrong with the memoirs of various key figures involved in the European Chancellories in 1914. Grey too manipulated his own memoirs and the British Blue Book twisted the facts. For example:
Grey - "I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things have gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a
crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia." (Grey to Bertie, July 31; B.D., 367): "The
words in italics [The latest news....forced by Russia] were suppressed from the British Blue Book of 1914 (No 119). They show that Grey realized the truth, but allowed it to be suppressed in order to support the Franco-Russian effort to minimize the importance of Russia's step." Sidney Fay ("The Origins of the World War" 2: 535)
A historian should at least be prepared to consider the possibility that a source is lying when it comes to a supposed 'smoking gun' or
'key quote'. Neither Mombauer (who also unquestioningly accepts this quote in her Moltke book p.172) nor Roehl, it seems, have
considered this possibility.
As for the rest of the Jagow quote above: any general worth his salt has continually to consider the optimum conditions for his
country to wage war and has continually to be aware of the circumstances of potential enemies. That's the job of such military men!
If Moltke was aware of Russia's state of readiness, AND was convinced of Russia's intention to wage war against Germany in the
near future - as Moltke seems to have been, then he was duty bound to make his government aware of the best conditions under
which Germany could win such a war. How to respond to such information - whether to accept, ignore or reject it - was up to the civil authorities.
103: "When, after four weeks of severely misjudging the developing situation that was initiated by Kaiser and Chancellor’s very own
“Blank Cheque”, they started to get cold feet (see related paragraph in my Zy115103 11 Feb 2014 13:29) and it dawns on them that
they really were in the process of provoking a European war, what do they do to rectify the situation: hardly anything!"
Incorrect. See my responses above. Certainly, the German FO was incompetent, and certainly they had misjudged the situation -
because they had not realised that they were walking right into a trap set by the Russians and the French, neither of whom would have
made a move without the British. The visit of Grey and the King to Paris in April 1914 (Grey's FIRST overseas trip as Foreign
Secretary!) eventually resulted in the secret Anglo-Russian Naval Convention, which became known in June and which both the French and the Russians were angling for. The visit was paralleled by that of Poincare and Viviani to Russia July 20-23, which finalised the arrangements and determined the participants.
103: "It is instructive at this point to recall a situation in 1887: German warmongers called a War Council as they wanted a
preventative invasion of France, before the French became even stronger: by 1887 the Gallic Nation had recovered appreciably from
the depredations of the 1870/71 conflict. The then German Emperor Wilhelm I, Wilhelm II’s grandfather, reluctantly acceded to the
aggressive preventative war. When Reich Chancellor Bismarck was informed of this criminal nonsense, he threatened to resign and
the old Emperor, who died the following year, gladly called off the whole illegitimate scheme."
This 1887 Franco-German spat was just that - a spat, and as 103 points out, was promptly dealt with by Bismarck. There were warmongers in all countries. In France, Boulanger for example.
And 103 might also like to investigate what was going on among certain key British figures in that same year of 1887. What for
instance, Lord Salisbury was doing in Dieppe in the autumn with the French Baron Chaudordy, what the Prince of Wales and his Danish wife were doing in Denmark with her sister Dagmar and her significant husband Czar Alexander III of Russia, and what Randolph Churchill and his wife were doing in Russia.... S/he might find that precisely in that very year the first stirrings were being made in French capital markets towards massive investments in Russia and the first stirrings in Britain that would lead to the British diplomatic revolution that was completed 20 years later with the Anglo-Russian Entente - the long-term goal of the circle around the Prince of Wales in the 1880s and King Edward VII in the 1900s. S/he might to look into the activities of W T Stead of the Pall Mall Gazette and his Russian friend Madame Olga Novikoff....
You see, people like 103 are so focused by their anti-German prejudice on Berlin, that hive of diplomatic incompetents (Bisnarck
excepted) that they do not pay attention to the places such as London, Paris, the Vatican and even St.Petersburg, places which for
*centuries* already in the 1880s had been centres of *global power* and had accumulated considerable diplomatic and foreign policy acumen. If they did pay attention to these things, they would realise that even before Wilhelm II became Kaiser, plans were being made in those centres for the diplomatic reordering of Europe in the 20th century, plans that would involve a great European war to achieve their goals.
Evident ignorance of such things leads to 103 writing:
"“The Entente powers”, Zy113756/Mr B? writes, were “set on war” in late July. Really? Certainly not Great Britain, as the British
Cabinet voted overwhelmingly on the morning of 1st August not to intervene!"
103 has to ask him/herelf how it was that on 29th July the British Liberal Cabinet could vote 15-5 against intervention and again on 1st
August, yet on 2nd and 3rd August those 5 interventionists, led by Grey and Churchill and backed by Asquith, were able to reverse that situation and push, bully and harangue their frightened spineless colleagues into war. S/he needs to ask him/herself what was the role of Churchill's and Asquith's allies in the Tory Party and in the military? The role of Churchill's Tory friend F.E.Smith that fateful
weekend ? The role of the Tory Leaders' Note from Bonar Law, Balfour and Lansdowne to the critical Cabinet meeting on 2 August?
Above all, s/he needs to investigate how Grey's bullying threat of resignation could push them over the edge that day and how it was
that Grey had become Foreign Secretary at all - a man with close to ZERO real understanding of foreign affairs, foreign cultures, and foreign languages. S/he needs to look at the Relugas Compact plot that put him there in late 1905 and how that came about. S/he needs to look at the men who surrounded Grey in the Foregn Office and who put THEM there and especially at Sir Charles hardinge, the man of the world who served and steered Grey as Foreign Secretary from 1906 to 1910 - all of this so that Grey would "do the right thing" in a very British way when it came to the crunch in July/August 1914.
103: "Why had the relentless exertions of those allegedly all-powerful British and Entente warmongers who according to
Zy113756/Mr B? were eager to send in the troops, resulted at that late date, in a Cabinet decision to stay neutral? "
See the above!
103: "Once again, it was further German provocations that changed the situation dramatically for the British Cabinet: the invasion of
Belgium and the transit of large German warships through the newly completed Kiel Canal, not only threatened the French coast
which Britain was committed to protect, but these naval dispositions imperilled the Island Nation’s trade e.g. vital agricultural imports
etc. That Germany could have been so criminally stupid not only to invade Belgium but additionally send battleships from the Baltic
to the North Sea at this critical phase in the crisis beggars belief. How was it possible that this navy-obsessed Kaiser and his
chancellor did not realise that increasing the number battleships on the German North Sea coast opposite England and within easy
striking distance of the French shoreline could only fatally exacerbate an already perilous situation, in August 1914."
Germany would not have made any moves at all if France and Britain (which had ordered its Fleet concentrated on 27th July) had
restrained Russia from mobilising its army in support of a terrorist State that had been found to be involved in the murder of the Heir
Apparent of a Great Power! Russia's 'logic': "My little friend has murdered your son and now you propose to give my little friend a
beating. No, I will not allow it. I shall kill you instead and I don't care if your friend Germany steps in." And Russia's 'friends', France
and Britain, say nothing to dissuade Russia from this course of action; France (Poincare and the French revanchists) rub their hands
with glee at the prospect and Britain (the warloving Churchill) prepares its navy for war. Why is this? Because France and Russia had
decided on war, knowing they would ultimately be able to rely on British support.
As for 103's bizarre statements about the German Navy and Kiel Canal, s/he seems to have forgotten that the British Royal Navy and
the German Navy had been fraternising together at the opening of the Kiel Canal celebrations only a month before; they were doing so
on the very day of the Sarajevo assassinations! So much for "naval dispositions [that] imperilled the Island Nation’s trade e.g. vital
agricultural imports etc." The whole purpose of the Kiel Canal was to enable German ships to pass easily between the Baltic and the
North Sea. Britain raised no objections to it, and the fraternisation went on, as I have stated. In any case, both Churchill and Tirpitz
and their governments had recognised that Britain had won the naval race by 1912 already; Germany simply couldn't keep up. Its
finances were not up to it. This is widely recognised by historians today.
As for Germany being "so criminally stupid not only to invade Belgium but additionally send battleships from the Baltic to the North
Sea at this critical phase in the crisis beggars belief", I note 103 does not consider it criminally stupid for the British to send the mega
-war readiness signal of ordering their Fleet (their main weapon of war) to be concentrated on the 27th already - hardly a pacific message - BEFORE Austria and Serbia were at war (though Serbia had already mobilised), BEFORE Russia, France and Germany (in that order) had mobilised and BEFORE Germany invaded Belgium, which in any case did not happen until 4th August. Having delivered his infamous, duplicitous and ONLY major speech on the crisis in Parliament on the afternoon of 3rd August, Grey then sat back and once again did nothing (besides demanding the Belgians resist suicidally if/when the Germans entered Belgium - Telegramme 155); he communicated nothing to Germany for over 24 hours, because he was WAITING for German troops to enter Belgium so that he could declare war. He played a clever waiting game throughout the crisis, as Churchill recognised and described in his book "The World Crisis." Grey had to play this wiaitng game because of the anti-war mood of his Cabinet colleagues; he had to take them carefully, step by step, right to the brink before HE pushed them over it with his threat of resignation on 2nd Aug and Britain then made the naval commitment to France that day, which the French ambassador Paul Cambon immediately and happily recognised as Britain's final and definitive signal that it was entering the conflict.
103 then attempts to defend him/herself with regard to his/her excessive dependence on hypotheticals:
"Regarding Hypotheticals. In one’s own defence, it was not yours truly who lobbed the first hypothetical into the discussion: as with
Austria-Hungary and Germany, Zy113756/Mr B? should also not be surprised if a provocation results in a reaction!"
I had already pointed out that I had no objection to hypotheticals per se (and did indeed use one myself, as 103 notes), but that I did
object to arguments that consisted *almost entirely* of them which 103's post did.
103 then proceeds to try to make a 'clever' point about conditional forms in grammar:
"Whilst on the subject of one’s hypotheticals and the related “probably…possibly…would…could”, that apparently so frustrated
Zy113756/Mr B?: one cannot rationally use a definite form when dealing with conjecture, otherwise one is in danger of looking foolish
e.g. in Zy113756/Mr B?’s 12 Feb 2014 01:38, one reads:
Zy115103 goes on to question my "allegation" that “Tory leaders would STILL have sought to involve Britain in the war” and asks if
I seek to imply, in making this "allegation", "that Britain would definitely entered [sic] the war if Germany had not illegally invaded
neutral Belgium?"
The answer to that is definitely: YES. Belgium was nothing but a hollow pretext.
Here Zy113756/Mr B? seemingly lays claim supranatural knowledge: How can anyone rationally claim that something “definitely”
would have happened…when in reality it did not, when it is hypothetical? Had Zy113756/Mr B? time-machined back a hundred years
and somehow stopped Germany invading Belgium, in order to confirm aggressive British reactions? Or perhaps a portal to a parallel
universe or a Divine Vision, is the source of the “definite” occurrence that indubitably did not happen on this planet? The
undersigned may have said: probably, or possibly, or would most likely have come to pass, but then I have no access to revelations
from the beyond… Zy113756/Mr B? makes similarly sweeping non-conditional statements in other places, that are perhaps simpler to
write and concise, but strictly speaking, academically insupportable?"
All of 103's condescending sarcasm above is very easily contradicted by the fact that we know from a number of
sources that Britain did NOT enter the war for the sake of Belgium but for the sake of her Entente with FRANCE, and through
France (as France had always been seen as a stepping stone) for the sake of her Entente with Russia. It was for THESE two that
Britain went to war, not for Belgium. Belgium was only the trick used to keep the Liberal Cabinet together and also to provide the
princess figure (threatened by the wicked dragon) that the unknowing British public could be hoodwinked into donning their usual St.
George armour for. It's a technique that has been used time and time again by unscrupulous British governments to lead the people
into wars, most recently, it was tried (and thankfully failed) in summer 2013; before that, it was used effectively in 2011 and 2003. If
that Liberal Cabinet in 1914 had had more backbone, they would have DEMANDED Grey resign - in which case Asquith, Churchill,
Haldane and probably Crewe (the Liberal Imperialist minority faction in the Cabinet) would also have resigned with him, and the
government would have fallen unless somehow the majority could have prevailed upon Lloyd George to lead them and cobble
together replacements for Grey & Co, but that was unlikely, as Lloyd George had already secretly been in sympathy with the Liberal
Imperialist faction since his Mansion House speech of July 1911. That was why he took so long to declare his own hand over the
crisis weekend of 30 July - 3rd August. A Tory government would certainly have committed the country to war, as is clearly
indicated by the Note from the Tory leaders that was passed to Asquith during the 2nd August Cabinet meeting. Not a word about
Belgium was mentioned in it. It spoke only of France. The Tories inside and outside Parliament were stuffed with warmongers. We
also know from the writings of Cabinet members such as Harcourt and Morley that it was not for Belgium that the Cabinet really
decided to enter the conflict but for France. Morley said that Belgium had furnished "'a plea...for intervention on behalf of France'.
This was also the view of Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George's mistress, and Ramsay MacDOnald, who dined with Lloyd George on
the evening of 2 August." (Ferguson, "The Pity of War", p.164). Belgium WAS a pretext.
103 then tries to tackle my observation about the 1916 peace offer:
"The speculation [Zy113756/Mr B? ] proffers concerns events in 1916 and this begs the question: how do possible feeble Teutonic
peace feelers in 1916, naturally at a point when things were not going too well for Germany, shed light on the origins of WWI? The
situation in the war’s second year was in no way analogous to pre-war conditions! Would it be superfluous to point out that fighting
was taking place in 1916 only because Germany and Austria-Hungary caused the war in the first place and to quote Zy113756/Mr B?:
“THAT was the reality”.
First, if 103 would care to actually study the situation in late 1916, s/he would find that though all combatants were pretty exhausted
then, the year had actually gone rather better for the Central Powers. The Allies' Somme offensive had essentially failed in its
objectives, all the territory won by the Russian Brusilov offensive had been regained by the Central Powers, who had taken great
sources of raw materials from Russia, which by December was on its knees; the German U-boat campaign was becoming ever more
successful, and the Allies were not doing well in the Middle East. Above all, their new ally Romania had been knocked out by a swift
Austro-German offensive under General Mackensen which brought the Central Powers welcome resources of oil and wheat.
The situation in December 1916 WAS in one sense analogous to that of prewar conditions in that the group who came to power in
the sordid political coup that took place in Britain that month was essentially the faction led by Alfred Lord Milner (the successor to
the Rhodes-Milner Group) a Tory operation with Lloyd George as the hostage Liberal talking puppet figurehead, and Balfour as the
Foreign Secretary, Milner as Minister without Portfolio (i.e. 'ubique'); this same group had been one of the main driving forces behind
the formation of British foreign policy in the period 1890-1914. It worked in tandem with 'the Cecil network' and the circle around
Edward VII - all of whom were seeking to reorient British foreign policy towards Russia and France and away from Austria and
Germany. It was this group then, under Milner and Balfour, speaking through the big mouth of their puppet Lloyd George, that
rejected the peace proposals of both the Central Powers and President Wilson of the USA in December 1916 - Jan.1917. Those
proposals may have been vague, but they were nevertheless a basis for making PEACE. But Lloyd George and his backers were set
on war to the bitter end, so they refused to make peace. And what was the result of going on with the war? Two Russian revolutions, the emergence of Bolshevism, Versailles, and later Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, World War II, the Cold War etc etc.
To adapt 103's words then, Would it be superfluous to point out that fighting was taking place in 1917 and 1918 only because the Entente Powers, and especially Britain, REFUSED TO MAKE PEACE - “THAT was the reality”. If the British had accepted the offers of the central Powers or Wilson, the French and the Russians would not have gone on fighting. Just as they would not have entered the war in the first place if they had been unsure of the backing of the British in 1914.
103: "One is looking forward to Zy113756/ Mr B?’s views on the South Korean hypothetical in my 20 Feb 2014 17:59, that is
relevant and analogous to the position in which Austria-Hungary and Germany found themselves, in 1914?
103 can look forward all s/he likes but in vain. I shall not be bothering to engage with fruitless hypotheticals about the Korean War in
a discussion about 1914-18.
103, blowing his/her own trumpet yet again: "Harking back to the unassailable conclusions offered at the start of this posting..."
As we have seen, they were hardly unassailable....
103 now tries to engage with my argument about the long preparation for the Great War:
"Zy113756/Mr B? has mentioned several of these at length. He refers to e.g.:
“all of the evidence that argues for a design by certain elements in the Entente Powers - stretching back to the 1880s - to bring about
a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary”.
Those fiendish Entente elements! However, he does not mention the warmongering 1887 German War council, outlined in the
foregoing, now why was that, the neutral observer asks?"
Neutral observer ?? 103 is pulling our leg.
The Franco-German war scare of 1887 was a relatively small scale affair (there had been another such scare in 1875). 1914 was of
another magnitude altogether and the real key to that catastrophe was that Britain, THE global Power, was involved, which it was not
in the Franco-German spats of 1875 and 1887. In the period 1887-1907 Britain changed its diplomatic course entirely from what it
had been in the 19th century since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. By 1907 Britain had in effect joined the Franco-Russian Alliance!
This colossal change of diplomatic course had required careful, clandestine planning so as to pull the wool over the eyes of the
British public and even over those of large sections of the elite (as many Liberals realised - too late - once war had broken out)
because an orientation towards the traditional enemies France and Russia went very much against the grain for Britons on all sides of
the political fence. Even Lord Rosebery, for example, onetime leader of the Liberal Imperialists, spoke out against the Entente
Cordiale and said it would lead to war. H G Wells and Bertrand Russell, early members of the Coefficients, the Edwardian 'thinktank'
pioneered by the Fabian Socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb, both recognised that the foreign policy ideas, the Entente ideas, of Sir
Edward Grey, who also, like several other members of the Milner Group was a member of the Coefficients, would lead to war with
Germany, and Russell spoke out strongly against Grey's ideas before resigning from the Coefficients.
The main problem, it seems to me, with 103's approach to 1914-18 is that it is that of the one club golfer. S/he has only one club in his/her bag. Or, to use another metaphor: why bother using sunlight, s/he seems to say, when you can use a candle? And that ONE club, that ONE candle is for him/her the blank cheque of 6 July, which s/he returns to ever and again instead of trying to understand the complexity of what led to 1914. For example, s/he says:
"Also missing is an explanation as to why those myriads of influential Entente jingoists and others who passionately wanted a
major war, wholly failed for decades to attain their nefarious objective? Hordes of historians have discovered and are still unearthing
all sorts of fascinating facts that add to our (background) knowledge, in this regard. There were “warmongers”, revanchists, self-
serving, corrupt, grubby, weak or strong politicians, passionate nationalists, sinister French occultists with odd names, mad monks,
newspaper campaigns, arms-dealers and greedy businessmen, gung-ho militarists, the prejudiced and the incompetent and those too
clever by half, not to mention misjudgements on every side, yes, indeed, yes! However, to determine the immediate origin of the war
we must view this data critically and forensically, we must cut through the noise and clutter: what actions (not hopes, or intentions, or
rhetoric) were the critical ones that led directly to war. What action(s) was essential in order for the war to have occurred at that point
and without which there would not have been a war? WWI did not properly start until Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, an
act that came to pass only after Germany had given its unlimited support for this aggressive action. (This German backing was
obviously also an indispensable pre-condition for the various and related cascade of mobilisations, later on)."
So, there it is again. The SINGLE club. Away with complexity! s/he says, that is mere "noise and clutter". Let us instead focus, s/he calls, on the ONE 'fact' that - according to 103 - is of supreme importance: the blank cheque.
103: "Of course the killing of the couple in Sarajevo was a prerequisite, but utterly insufficient of itself, to cause a war and it is clear
that those deaths in Bosnia were not the real motivation for Austria-Hungary to take up arms in 1914. Misguided individuals are
forever executing stupid and dangerous plans that are often high profile but relatively small in scale; these actions almost never justify
the invasion of a sovereign state. The Sarajevo assassinations certainly did not in themselves make war inevitable....".
So far so good, 103! How will you go on?
103: "...Looking back, the “Blank Cheque” pretty well did make war inevitable:...."
Oh dear! There it is again. That single golf club. As I have argued throughout, the blank cheque did not make *a world war*
inevitable. A blank cheque has nothing written on it. Kaiser Wilhelm's communication to Emperor Franz Josef did have something
written on it. The REAL blank cheque, I have argued - the one that made the *world war* possible - was the one given by Britain
and France to Russia in the form of a sweet NOTHING - for nothing was said to restrain. It was just assumed that Russia must be allowed to start a general European war in defence of Serbia, which had been involved in a major crime of state.
Furthermore, the prime strategic goals of France (Alsace-Lorraine) and Russia (Constantinople, Dardanelles, Russian-led
Balkan League) could ONLY be achieved through WAR, the defeat of Germany and the destruction of Austria-Hungary; that is why
France and Russia especially needed a war to try to achieve their aims. Britain's aims were more subtle. Britain's real enemy - as seen
by her deepest elite - was in fact Russia, not Germany at all. In order to get Russia into a war against Germany, Britain had to ally
herself with Russia and turn Germany into an enemy, which she proceeded to do after the false constructed brouhaha over the
Kaiser's Kruger telegram in Jan. 1896 following the Jameson Raid, which so greatly embarrassed the British (as their own government
was involved in that sordid episode). See A J A Morris' brilliant study "The Scaremongers" (1984) for how this brouhaha was
achieved in the media mind-control network of those days and how it was connected to the formation of the Ententes.
Then 103 might like to reflect on these words from Lord Salisbury, whose family was involved in so much of what transpired in
Britain between 1887and 1919:
Salisbury to Sir Robert Morier 1885: Russia's only weak point was "her financial embarrassment...it is to that weak point that our efforts must be addressed. We must lead her into all the expense we can" so that "a few steps further must push her into the revolution over which she seems constantly to be hanging." (Charmley, "Splendid Isolation", p.201)
Charmley comments that Salisbury saw that: "Time and chance might provide the answer to the Russian problem: revolution, Islamic revival or war against Germany" – Britain should wait, [and] be on guard. ("Splendid Isolation", p.213). That's how Salisbury saw things in 1885. Two years later, he had decided not to wait but to make a move himself and initiated talks with Chaudordy in Dieppe aimed at bringing about an Anglo-French-Russian 'understanding'. For the reasons I have already outlined above, it took 20 years to bring this 'understanding' to full fruition and 27 years to bring about its apotheosis in the cataclysm of 1914. Revolution, Islamic revival or war against Germany..... All three of those have since occurred for Russia, and the West was involved in all three.
103 ploughs on down his/her single furrow:
"...at the beginning of July 1914, the Austro-Hungarians wanted to slap down Serbia and needed German support against Russia,
without which war with Serbia was infeasible."
Not quite true. The Austrians had no fear of taking on Serbia alone, but IF Russia threatened to step in, they recognised they could not cope with both Russia and Serbia, and so turned to Germany. Now, Germany and Austria had a defensive alliance - all Europe knew that. So if Russia attacked Austria, Russia knew that Germany would be duty-bound to assist her ally. Russia therefore knew that a war against Austria would mean a war against Germany. Russia further knew that it could not achieve its goals without a war against precisely these two countries and that in its drive to war it was supported by its ally France and its Entente partner Britain because no matter how much the British protested that they had no intention to go to war for the sake of a Russian quarrel with Austria over Serbia, that is in fact what they ended up doing. Britain went to war for France and France went to war for Russia, but
for Russia, Serbia was a pretext for a greater war to achieve its own long-desired goals, just as, for Britain, Belgium was a pretext for a greater war to achieve its own long-planned goals.
Finally, we have arrived (if anyone besides myself and 103 has had the patience to read this far!) at 103's final statement in his/her post of 1 March and guess what it is? Well, of course, you guessed it - the single club.
"It was the wildly reckless, needlessly given German unconditional “Carte Blanche” for war against Serbia (ably assisted in the
following four weeks by extraordinary incompetent German political and military shenanigans) that incontrovertibly started the
countdown to war."
Fritz Fischer was German. Annika Mombauer is German. 103 also appears, from something s/he wrote in his/her first post in this thread, to be German (?) I feel I must ask myself: what is it that makes these three Germans loathe their country so, that they feel obliged to load upon it all the sins of the modern world, which, it is said with much justification, came from the crucible of the First World War? And to do so, moreover, with the simplistic method of one club golfing? All 3 of three of them have in common in their argumentation about 1914 and the origins of the First World War the fact that they are one glub golfers: Fischer with his 1912 War Council and his September 1914 memorandum (well, maybe 2 clubs in his case); Mombauer with her 'Moltke the evil genius' line and 103 with his/her 'blank cheque'. I can't help feeling that the British, with their history of global perspective, their instinct for clandestine operations and their sense for complex plots, for the peripheral element of what's in the air, for paradox and irony, will not find much interest in a game of one club golf. They will sense it doesn't do justice to the game and cannot explain the living complexity of the matter.
To end, here are a couple of quotes from the excellent book "The Policy of the Entente" by Keith M.Wilson, from the chapter 'The Invention of Germany', that is, of the so-called 'German threat' :
"The invention of Germany, for this is what, on the part of many [Foreign Office] advisers and takers of advice, it amounted to, fulfilled important psychological needs. The more unflattering the portrayal of Germany, the more flattering that of Great Britain. the greater ther menace of Germany, the better able were some people to persuade themselves that they had a role to play. The picture that many at the Foreign Office had of themselves depended on their picture of Germany. Portraying Germany as they did was the only way for them to restore their self-respect. For Britain's international position in the period of the ententes fell far short of what, in the eyes of most of them, it might have been.....Grey and his officials used their image of the past as a model for the present. Germany was tailored [by them] to suit the role the British needed to play in order to be able to live with themselves." (Wilson, pp.118-119)
The British elite and their allies in the media needed, in other words, to make Germany seem wicked - the St.George vs the Dragon trope again - in order to make Britain seem 'good' and to justify cleaving to France and Russia, whereas in fact, they were cleaving to France and Russia for quite different reasons, namely, fear of their own weakness and decline, and fear of the loss of India and even of their Empire itself to their two main imperial rivals. In 1914 after all, Germany accounted for 1/33 of the world's surface; all Germany had to fight the war was the fortitude and calibre of its people, its military and its industry, while Britain, France and Russia and all their possessions together accounted for almost 3/4 of the entire world.
Terry Boardman - 11 March 2014 2:16pm
I don't know why my post of 11th March has been uploaded in such a fragmented fashion. Something seems to have gone wrong with the site upload system here? Hopefully, readers will still be able to follow the argument.
Terry Boardman - 9 March 2014 8:03pm
This is the second half of my reply to Zy115103's post "WWI Origins Hypotheticals Realpolitik Mobilisations" 20 Feb 2014.
Zy115103 (hereafter 103) has been trying to insist that Germany will be declared "guilty as charged". As promised, I'll now move on to the second part of 103's post of 20 Feb before responding to 103's latest posting (1 March) in a separate post.
Firstly, 103 stakes out his/her PC 'democratic' credentials by insinuating that Franz Ferdinand and his wife were simply murder victims like anyone else, and at one level, that is of course true - two human beings were murdered. But he was not just any Austrian Archduke; he was the heir to the throne and given the advanced age of Emperor Franz Josef, he could have been expected to accede at any time. If the head of state or the soon-to-be head of state of a major Power is assassinated, then consequences will result that will be more serious for the perpetrators (and in this case the Serbian State was involved) than would be the case in the homicide of Joe and Joanna Smith. 103 may deplore that but it happens to be the case.
103 goes on to argue that: "the form that the retribution takes...must be limited and proportional, but that is quite obviously not what Austria-Hungary and Germany planned in 1914: in what universe is invading a country – and starting a war - an appropriate response, a primary option, for the murder of two persons, aristocratic or not?"
But of course, it suits 103 here in his/her hyperbole to omit the entire context in which these particular murders took place:
1) in 1903 some of the characters directly involved in the assassinations of 1914 (Dragutin Dmitrijevic and friends, who later organised the Black Hand terrorist group that aided the Sarajevo assassins) slaughtered (literally) their own Serbian King and Queen in their own palace in Belgrade in a coup that horrified all of Europe, but it was fairly soon forgotten in Britain, France and Russia a) because Russia had supervised the whole incident and b) because the killings replaced a monarch from the Obrenovich dynasty who was more friendly to Austria-Hungary with one from the Karageorgevich dynasty that was more well-disposed to France and Russia, and thereafter we see France replacing Austria as Serbia's main source of finance; we also see Serbia moving, or rather, being moved by France and Russia and her own fanatical nationalists, in a steadily more anti-Austrian and aggressive direction.
2) a whole series of anti-Austrian terrorist incidents, murders and attempted murders of Austro-Hungarian officials proceeded from Serbia in the late 19th century and especially in 1903-1914. These came mainly from the Serb ultranationalist secret or semi-secret societies of the Omladina, Narodna Odbrana, Mlada Bosnia and finally the Black Hand itself. The incidents included plots against the lives of the Governor of Bosnia and the Emperor himself. The Austro-Hungarians put up with these provocations without moving against Serbia in any military way, not least because Franz Ferdinand was a man who was resolutely opposed to war against Serbia, against Russia, or against any other country. Once HE was removed from the picture - by the Serbs themselves, and as in 1903, the Russian charge d'affaires in Belgrade, (in 1914 Hartwig), was well-informed as to what was going on - it was hardly surprising, given the level of Serbian terrorist acts and provocations over the previous 20 years, that 'less pacifically minded' people in the Austro-Hungarian government should have decided that "enough is enough, Serbia must be taught a lesson. Our future emperor has now been killed by the Serbs. If we don't act, it will be a huge loss of face for us as a major Power". And that is precisely what they did decide. Now 103 may again deplore such a motive for war - loss of face - but if s/he wishes to deal with reality and not with hypotheticals only, then s/he must recognise that such loss of face has been a motive for war countless times throughout the ages and is still an important factor today, as we are currently seeing in the manoeuvrings going on over the Ukraine/Crimea crisis.
3) There was a widespread feeling throughout Europe in July 1914, in Britain for example, that Serbia was in the wrong and that 'punishment' was justified. Even Churchill and Asquith felt this for a time.
As I had said in an earlier post, there is a place for hypothetical counterfactuals in historical studies but not at the expense of replacing the search for facts which 103 in his/her post of 20 Feb seemed keen to do, most of that post consisting of hypotheticals. I then introduced a hypothetical of my own. 103 replied: "In Zy113756’s above hypothetical, Britain asks the USA for support. The USA would consider what was appropriate, but certainly it would not authorise the Brits to proceed with a full scale invasion of the nation that sponsored the murders of the PoW and DoC, because a few members of the country’s elite were implicated in the crime. To extend the hypothetical: it is utterly inconceivable that the USA would then go on violate the territory of a country (in 1914 Belgium) whose neutrality had been guaranteed by the USA itself!"
The response to this is:
1) Austria had no intention of a "full-scale invasion" of Serbia or of "wiping Serbia off the map". They knew that the forced extinction of a state would not have been acceptable in the Europe of 1914. Neither did the Germans want the Austrians to do that, blank cheque or no blank cheque. What the Austrians and Germans wanted was a punishment of Serbia that would restore the "face" of Austria as a Great Power and as a factor in 'the Concert of Europe'. 103's argument is therefore a variant of the 'reductio ad absurdum'.
2) 103 then implies that Germany had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. It had not. Prussia had done so, not Germany, as the German Reich did not exist in 1839. Furthermore, re. the Belgian neutrality issue, Prime Ministers Gladstone, and Salisbury, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne and Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretaries Sanderson and Hardinge had all acknowledged that Britain would act with regard to Belgian neutrality *not in accordance with the letter of the treaty* but in accordance with Britain's interests and the circumstances of the time. So all the self-righteous prattle in 1914 and since about Britain in 1914 respecting international law, Britain holding to the sacredness of treaties etc. was just that - prattle - and what in those days used to be called 'humbug'. Again, 103 may deplore this but again s/he ought to pay attention to fact and reality in foreign and indeed human affairs. How human beings actually treat each other for good or for ill is more important than shoulds and ought tos on pieces of paper.
103, however, chooses to go on in the following way:
"In 1914 Imperial Germany needlessly went to war for an ally and definitely did send in the jackboots?"
In passing, I note 103's insidious attempt - in the use of the phrase 'send in the jackboots', so evocative for the British - to run the Germans of 1914 along with the Nazis of 1939-45. A low tactic, if I may say.
Imperial Germany did not *needlessly* go to war for an ally. Austria was Germany's ONLY ally, Italy having already done a deal with the Entente Powers behind the backs of the Germans and Austrians. Everyone in diplomatic circles in those days knew that if it came to the crunch, Italy would not fight alongside Germany and Austria against the Entente Powers. Russia had already been secretly engaged in partial mobilisation since 25 July and on 30 July declared *general* mobilisation. This meant WAR against both Austria and Germany. The move was backed all along by the French. On 30 July Abel Ferry the French under-secretary of state recorded that the French Cabinet that day had ordered: "Mobilise but do not concentrate. Do not stop Russian mobilisation." (Ponting, "Thirteen Days", p.216) Neither had the French *at any time* since 28 June attempted to stop their ally Russia's moves towards war; on the contrary they had encouraged them. At the drawing up in 1892 of the Military Convention (i.e. annex) to the Franco-Russian Alliance, the military leaders of France and Russia at the time, Boisdeffre and Obruchev respectively, had been at one in agreeing that mobilisation was the first act of WAR and they had communicated this to their governments. All those in the know were aware of this fact in 1914 - mobilisation for all armies meant war, and declarations of war were not necessary. They were but the legal leftovers from a previous age. The Japanese, for example, had already attacked Russia in 1904 before declaring war. Without German assistance, Austria would have been crushed by Russia, so how can 103 say Germany "needlessly" went to war for an ally? What 103 and the apologists for the Entente consistently do is ignore the FACT that Russia ignored the FACT that Serbia had committed 'a high crime and misdemeanour'. Russia was saying, in effect: "our Serbian brothers have committed a serious political murder at the highest level but if you seek to punish them, we shall punish you because they are our brothers." And then 103 has the gall to talk about international LAW ???!!! A similar thing is happening today over Ukraine. 'The West' is ignoring HOW the new Ukrainian regime came to power and instead is focusing on a later event, namely, Russia's actions in Crimea, which resulted directly from that regime change,.
103 then goes on to draw yet another long and involved hypothetical out of his/her box of tissues, relating to Korea today, with which, since s/he says him/herself, "The situation on the Korean peninsula in 2014 is clearly not the same as central Europe in 1914", I shall not bother to engage.
103 then suddenly steps out of the world of make-believe and *appears* to return to reality:
"Russian intervention was a given, whether one liked it or not. It was not a moral issue, a question of Russia being “in the right”; it was a matter of realpolitik. Only the foolishly naïve ignore a given. Austria-Hungary accepted that Russia would intervene, otherwise what was the point of the Hoyos mission to Berlin? It was surely the function of officials in Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary to do the best they could with this reality. The artful use of diplomacy was called for, to forge a coalition with the west and then get an agreement to punish Serbia in a way that did not involve a potential European war. After all, it was the central powers that wanted action against Serbia, therefore it behoved them to take the initiative and deal with Serbia in a rational and mature manner. The ball was in their court and they failed catastrophically."
So, having sought to lecture me on the values of international law in previous posts and Germany's alleged heinous infringement thereof, suddenly 103 shifts to arguing on the basis of *realpolitik*. One can ask 103: 'in terms of *reality*, what hope was there that a "coalition with the west" to punish Serbia could have been forged? Secondly, 'if Russian intervention was not a moral issue, then what was Britain doing for example, trumpeting about moral issues (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons 3 August 1914). Britain was going to war to defend France, Russia's ally; France was going to war for the sake of Russia [and of course ro recover Alsace Lorraine], but France had done nothing to deter Russia from war and neither for that matter had Britain. Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Arthur Nicolson (an acolyte of Sir Charles Hardinge Vicroy in India and former PUS at the FO under Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1910), Sir George Buchanan, ambassador at St Petersburg all felt throughout 1914 and up to Britain's entry into the war that Britain basically had to do what Russia wanted otherwise Britain would lose Russia's "friendship", by which they meant Russia would cause serious problems for Britain in Asia, notably India and that Britain might even lose India to the Russians.
103 then says: "The second paragraph of Zy113756 17 Feb 2014 21:41 refers to France and Britain’s carte blanche to Russia. Does one understand that Zy113756 has unearthed papers contemporaneous with the 1914 July Crisis and prior to the Imperial German carte blanche of 5th and 6th of July, that prove an unlimited commitment to Russia, by duly authorised representatives of the two western powers, for any action that Russia considered appropriate against the central powers? When will [sic] see these highly important, presently unknown, documents published?
First of all, as to the "blank cheque" sent from Berlin to Vienna (6 July), it stated, having referred to various other countries (Bulgaria, Romaina etc):
"Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship."
(http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/blankcheque.htm)
Not exactly bloodcurdling, is it? It doesn't say : "The Emperor believes Austria should attack Serbia as soon as possible and will back Austria no matter what." In fact, it merely reaffirms the essence of the Austro-German alliance.
But 103's heavy-handed sarcasm aside, what I was drawing attention to was not the fact of a new undiscovered document but to the existence of the *omission* of a document or even a statement - the signal LACK of ANY real effort on the part of France (Russia's ally) and Britain (Russia's Entente 'partner') to restrain Russia or to seek to persuade her that, given the circumstances of the history of Serbian outrages against Austria over the years culminating in the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne and his wife, (a contect 103 has ignored) Serbia could only expect some form of censure and or punishment by Austria and that therefore Russia would not be justified in seeking to stop Austria from doing this. THIS LACK (a 'blank', after all, is an empty space, which the Kaiser's telegram on 6 July was not, in fact) actually amounted to a real "blank cheque"! Furthermore, it enabled the main warmongers in Russia (Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, Yanushkevich, Krivoshein and Grand Duke Nicholas) to pressure the Czar into signing the order for general mobilisation which all knew meant war, safe in the knowledge that no real statements of restraint would be coming from France and Britain, as was made repeatedly clear to the Russians by the lack of any such statements by the French and British ambassadors Paleologue and Buchanan. Already on 24 July Sazonov told Buchanan that he thought Russian mobilisation "would at any rate have to be carried out" (Blue Book telegramme 6). What was Buchanan's response to this obvious sabre rattling? "I said that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria..." while the French ambassador Paleologue said: "our only chance for us to avert war was for us [i.e. Britain, France, Russia] to adopt a firm and united attitude." If you look at the rest of that telegramme you'll see that at no point does Buchanan say he suggested to the Russians that they should not intervene.
103 finally refers to the issue of mobilisation, and, casually throwing about insults such as "naive little children", "criminal negligence" etc.,, s/he argues:
"Mobilisations come AFTER a political decision i.e. the Austria-Hungarian and German decision to initiate a “limited war”, that due to these countries extraordinary and criminal negligence first went European, then Global? The central powers decided on war at the beginning of July 1914; did they have the right to cry foul, like naïve little children, when their potential enemies drew the appropriate conclusion and mobilised?
First I remind 103 of the considerable numbers of wars initiated around the globe and in Europe by Britain, France and Russia between 1871 and 1914. Second, I must point out to him/her that it was the mobilisation by RUSSIA that initiated the general continental European conflict. Without that mobilisation, no other war would have followed except a brief military incursioon - a slap across the face if you will - of Austrian troops into Serbia, which under the circumstances was only just. 103 apparently would have preferred, instead of that limited action, to see a general world conflagration, which is what we got as a result of Russia's action and the unquestioning and irresponsible support given to it by its ally France and its partner Britain.
I shall turn to 103's post of 1 March in a subsequent post of my own.
Harry Hudnall - 15 March 2014 6:02pm
Clava Tremendae Magistatis; Ockham's razor; Fear and Loathing in Lancashire.
It may be one’s favourite – but by no means only – “club” because it is contextually a really big one, a decisive monster of a weapon that seems to have unsettled Zy113756/Mr. B. to the extent that he wishes it would go away, but that is not going to happen until he manages to deploy something at least equally magisterial, which, sadly, until now has not been the case?
…so…here goes…
The question for Zy113756/Mr. B. is this and it is a simple one:
If Kaiser Wilhelm and Bethmann Hollweg had not given what has become known as the “Blank Cheque” to Austria-Hungary on the 5th and 6th July 1914, would Austria-Hungary have attacked Serbia in the knowledge that at the time of the planned attack, Austria-Hungary would also have to fight against Russia without an ally?
The answer to this simple question is of course NO: Austria-Hungary would not have fought against Serbia and Russia on its own.
Following from the above, clearly Austria-Hungary would not have presented its “formidable” ultimatum to Serbia, or declared war on that country, as such action would have been obviously suicidal considering the military feebleness of this empire, compared to Russia and Serbia. It goes without saying that no ultimatum meant no warlike Entente action (unless Zy113756/Mr. B. jumps embarrassingly into his Time Machine again and finds out that the Entente powers would bizarrely have DEFINITELY mobilised against the Triple Alliance because...well I will leave this space open). Therefore it is clear that WWI would not have ensued in the way that it did at the time that it did i.e. WWI as we know it would not have occurred?
That a WWI might have happened through another process is of course possible, but any such supposition would be an intolerable hypothetical and one knows how Zy113756/Mr. B. has come to despise such speculations, certainly from this side of the North Sea?
It is hoped that the above question(s) will be addressed directly by Zy113756/Mr. B. and no attempt will be made to “muddy the waters” or at discombobulation, or the deployment of red-herrings e.g. going on about actions of the Entente powers AFTER 6th July, that were essentially a pre-emptive response to the open secret of Austria-Hungary’s intended ultimatum, which itself was only possible due to the German “Carte Blanche”!!! No quibbling or tricks of argument thus, just address the question frankly and without resorting to prejudice please.
Zy113756 11 Mar 2014 14:10/Mr. B. has opened a gate to another as yet untrodden path through the Yellow Wood that is for each of us our own individual universe and this deals with the psychologically murky issue of nationals of a country that allegedly:
“loathe their country so, that they feel obliged to load upon it all the sins of the modern world”.
Regarding the unintentionally ironic and mentally revealing paragraph (quoted in full below) in Zy113756 11 Mar 2014 14:10:
One cannot of course speak for the two extremely distinguished and seemingly rational German historians that are mentioned, but as for the undersigned: I am not a national of ANY country that took part in WWI at ANY point i.e. not a Brit (empire/commonwealth), German, Russian, American, Canadian or Italian etc. although one has worked in London, New York etc. and travelled extensively in English speaking countries thereby picking up a smattering of the world’s current Lingua Franca. I am not in any way associated with a religion that would for historical reasons be inclined to be bear even the slightest grudge against Germany. Nor do I have anything in principle against modern Germany, to the contrary: its Kultur [sic] is to my mind, in many ways superior to that of other major nations, due in part to its outstanding record on human rights etc., its Constitution and admirable BVerfG (Supreme Court), and its quite consistently dazzling economic success over the past almost 70 years. Germany today is not perfect, but it is the country in which the undersigned has lived for some considerable time now and by choice, as I am of independent means. So, no, I am not now nor have I ever been a German or Austrian national, therefore like it or not, the alleged “club” that so cowed Zy113756 has been lovingly crafted by analytical, mature reflection. But that is quite enough about yours truly, for as we say over here: "Ein ewig Rätsel will ich bleiben mir und anderen".
Incidentally, how would Zy113756/Mr. B. (for the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice, assumed to be the possibly north country hailing Brit, “Mr Boardman” mentioned in a previous posting) characterise his all too obvious determination to largely exculpate the Triple Alliance powers from responsibility for WWI at the expense of his Motherland: less blame for Germany and Austria-Hungary inescapably means more for the Entente, more for Great Britain thus? Is this evidence that Zy113756/Mr. B. has come to “loathe” his homeland otherwise known as “Perfidious Albion”? The word Touché comes inexplicably to mind and the sound of a petard being made ready for hoisting. Of course, if the assumptions referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph are significantly incorrect, then Zy113756 (and readers) should ignore this paragraph and feel free give any helpful bio-information that he feels to be appropriate?
Oh, and can one ask Zy113756/Mr. B to read this posting carefully before he answers, as there is some evidence from a previous reply that he has not properly understood a rather straightforward question and therefore given an incomprehensible answer. Thanks.
Zy113756 11 Mar 2014 14:10:
“Fritz Fischer was German. Annika Mombauer is German. 103 also appears, from something s/he wrote in his/her first post in this thread, to be German (?) I feel I must ask myself: what is it that makes these three Germans loathe their country so, that they feel obliged to load upon it all the sins of the modern world, which, it is said with much justification, came from the crucible of the First World War? And to do so, moreover, with the simplistic method of one club golfing? All 3 of three of them have in common in their argumentation about 1914 and the origins of the First World War the fact that they are one glub golfers: Fischer with his 1912 War Council and his September 1914 memorandum (well, maybe 2 clubs in his case); Mombauer with her 'Moltke the evil genius' line and 103 with his/her 'blank cheque'. I can't help feeling that the British, with their history of global perspective, their instinct for clandestine operations and their sense for complex plots, for the peripheral element of what's in the air, for paradox and irony, will not find much interest in a game of one club golf. They will sense it doesn't do justice to the game and cannot explain the living complexity of the matter.”
OpenLearn Moderator - 12 February 2014 3:29pm
Hi,
We have passed your comments onto our academic Annika Mombauer and Annika has come replied with the following:-
"There has indeed been a long and protracted controversy about the Schlieffen Plan and whether or not there ever was such a thing. As Mr Boardman knows, I have engaged extensively with Terence Zuber’s views in various publications, as have many other scholars, and I do not agree with his general conclusions (that there was no Schlieffen Plan, and that Germany essentially acted defensively in 1914). Some of this debate is summarized in my review article ‘Of war plans and war guilt: The debate surrounding the Schlieffen Plan’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28 (5), 2005, pp. 857–885. An academic conference in Germany looked in detail at Zuber’s thesis. It resulted in a book on the Schlieffen Plan. Several of the contributors disagree with Zuber’s finding, and the book includes my own contribution ‘Der Moltke-Plan: Modifikation des Schlieffenplans bei gleichen Zielen?’ in Hans Ehlert; Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (eds.), Der Schlieffenplan: Analyse und Dokumente. Paderborn, Germany: Schoeningh 2006, pp. 79–99, soon to be available in English translation. A further detailed discussion of the German war plan can be found in ‘German War Plans’, in: Hamilton, Richard F. and Herwig, Holger H. eds. War Planning 1914. UK: Cambridge University Press 2010.
It is natural within the discipline of history, and particularly with regard to the topic of the origins of the First World War, for historians to disagree. However, OpenLearn is an entry-level provision for readers with a general interest in history. While we would always discuss historiographical debates in detail in our module materials, the nature of OpenLearn does not lend itself to detailed discussion of controversies.
That said, it is of course worth knowing that not everyone agrees with my interpretation of the Schlieffen Plan, and readers could fruitfully consult Zuber’s latest publication, or indeed his earlier study Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (Oxford University Press, 1999), for a different point of view. Since that book was published, a lengthy debate has been conducted, most prominently in the pages of the journal War in History (which OU students can access online via the OU library). As Mr Boardman says, that “conventional view” of the Schlieffen Plan is represented, inter alia, by myself, Holger Herwig, John Keegan, Robert Foley, Gerhard Gross and many others. We will have to agree to disagree on the nature of the Schlieffen Plan; most academic historians have remained unconvinced by Zuber’s position. I would, however, like to clarify that I have never argued anywhere that either Germany or Helmuth von Moltke were ‘solely responsible’ for the war."
Many thanks
OpenLearn Moderator